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Introduction 
Welcome to the 2007 edition of the NASA Range Safety Annual Report. This report, 
funded by NASA Headquarters, provides a NASA Range Safety overview for current and 
potential range users. Once again this year we present summaries from the various 
NASA Range Safety Program activities that took place throughout the year, as well as 
information on several special projects that appear to have a profound impact on the 
way we will do business in the future. 
The sections include a program overview and 2007 highlights of Range Safety Training, 
Range Safety Policy, Independent Assessments and Common Risk Tools Development; 
Support to Program Operations at all ranges that NASA conducts launch operations; a 
continuing overview of emerging range safety related technologies that will take us into 
the next century; Special Interests Items that include recent changes in the ELV Payload 
Safety Program; and status reports from all of the NASA Centers that have Range 
Safety responsibilities. 
As is the case each year, contributors to this report are too numerous to mention, but we 
thank individuals from the NASA Centers, the Department of Defense, and civilian 
organizations for their contributions. We've made a great effort to include the most 
current information available. We recommend the report be used only for guidance and 
the validity and accuracy of all articles be verified for any updates since this writing. 
This is the second year we've utilized this web based format for the annual report. We 
received lots of positive feedback from our first web based edition last year, and we 
hope you enjoy this year's product as well. 
This concludes my first year as the NASA Range Safety Manager. It's been a busy and 
productive year on many fronts as you'll note as you review this report. Thank you to 
everyone that's contributed to make this first year a successful one, and I look forward to 
working with all of you in the years to come. 
Alan Dumont 
NASA Range Safety Manager
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Agency Range Safety Program Overview and 2007 Highlights 
2007 proved to be yet another eventful and exciting year in the Range Safety realm. Before we 
highlight the areas covered in this year's edition, it's important to restate the goal of the NASA 
Range Safety Program. The program is defined in NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, dated 8 
July 2005, and is signed by the NASA Administrator. The goal of the program is to protect the 
public, the workforce, and property during range operations such as launching, flying, landing, 
and testing launch/flight vehicles. 
This goal applies to all NASA centers and test facilities and all NASA vehicle programs including 
expendable launch vehicles, reusable launch vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and the 
Space Shuttle as well as any NASA-funded commercial ventures that involve range operations. 
We meet the goal of the NPR by mitigating and controlling hazards, such as uncontrolled 
vehicles, debris, explosives, and toxics associated with range operations. Of note this year is 
that all NASA Centers with a range safety responsibility and the Headquarters Office of Safety 
and Mission Assurance held a meeting to do a tine-by-line review of the NPR to look at areas 
that need updating and suggest additions to strengthen the policy arm of NASA Range Safety. 
This is the second year we've published this report in a web-based format, and our outline 
remains mostly unchanged from last year. Once again, we cover several areas of range safety 
thatpoint to how we meet or implement the range safety program. One of our primary focuses 
relates to range safety training and our continuing efforts regarding the NASA Range Safety 
Training Program. We brought one additional class on-line in 2006, and completed the Range 
Safety course curriculum by bringing the Range Safety Operations Course on-line this year. 
We remain extremely busy in the development, implementation, and support of range safety 
policy. The Constellation program is in full swing, and we've been supporting tailoring exercises 
with representatives from the program, the 45th Space Wing, and the Launch Constellation 
Range Safety Panel. We take a close look at our variance and risk process and the changes 
that have taken place in that arena due to fully implementing the NPR requirements. We 
supported several launches this year and continue to work updated agreements with our 
partners at the Eastern and Western Ranges. 
NASA Range Safety personnel continue to support the Range Commander's Council meetings 
and have been involved in updating policy related to flight safety systems and flight safety 
analysis. A recap of these efforts is highlighted. We address our continued support to the 
Common Standards Working Group in efforts to codify requirements for reusable launch 
vehicles and updates to AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements; 91-711, 
Launch Safety Requirements for AFSPC Organizations; and 91-712, Launch Safety Software 
and Computing System Requirements. Unmanned aerial vehicle policy development for 
operations at the Eastern Range is highlighted as well as continuing efforts regarding several 
challenges that we faced in the flight safety systems realm this year. 
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Program was the focus of headquarters-sponsored 
Institutional, Facilities, and Operations Audit and we provide a synopsis of these efforts in this 
report. One area that received a lot of attention this year was the plan for development of a 
common risk analysis tool for all NASA Range Safety efforts. We discuss this effort in depth. We 
address launch operations at Kennedy Space Center, the Eastern and Western Ranges, 
Dryden Flight Research Center, and Wallops Flight Facility.
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One area that continues to hold the interest of many in the range safety community is emerging 
range safety technology. Several articles focus on efforts that have taken place over the past 
year. 
We once again provide insight to some special interest items, specifically the effort on the 
Eastern Range regarding Space Florida, expendable launch vehicle payload safety NPR 
development progress, and NASA Range Safety support to educational scientific balloon 
releases. 
We wrap up this issue with range safety reports from the NASA Centers that were actively 
involved with range safety issues throughout the year. The graphic below gives a brief overview 
of the major topics contained in this report. Feel free to migrate directly to any topic by selecting 
items that are of interest.
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The NASA Range Safety Training program grew to full strength this year. Efforts that began in 
2002 with a Phase 1 Range Safety Orientation course saw the completion of Phase 2 training 
development with the Range Flight Safety Operations course. These courses provide the 
training needs for range safety personnel and are applicable and available to NASA, the 
Department of Defense, and the Federal Aviation Administration as well as government support 
contractors. Courses are conducted at the NASA Safety Training Center and the Wallops Flight 
Facility. Although development is complete, we are always looking for inputs on updates for the 
course and potential instructors. 
The development strategy originally put in place has served well in reaching critical milestones. 
An original steering group comprised of NASA, the Air Force, and the Federal Aviation 
Administration provided the foundation for the basic outlines of the courses. 
Depending on the course content, the Range Safety Training Group had representatives from 
NASA Headquarters, Kennedy Space Center, Dryden Flight Research Center, Wallops Flight 
Facility, the 45th and 30th Space Wings, the Air Force Flight Test Center, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, the Missile Defense Agency, and members of the Range Safety Group of the 
Range Commanders Council. 
To date, we've conducted 17 Range Safety Orientation courses with 464 students in 
attendance, four Range Flight Safety Analysis courses with 65 students in attendance, three 
Range Flight Safety Systems courses with 52 students, and one Range Flight Safety 
Operations Course with 6 students. The schedule for all courses for 2008 is shown below. 
Range Safety Orientation 
As you can see in the outline below, the Range Safety Orientation course is designed to give 
NASA senior, program, and project managers an understanding of the Range Safety mission, 
associated policies and requirements, and NASA roles and responsibilities. It introduces 
students to the major ranges and their capabilities and services, defines and discusses the 
major elements of Range Safety, and briefly addresses associated range safety topics such as 
ground safety, frequency management, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
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The course emphasizes the principles of safety risk management to ensure the public and 
NASA workforces are not subjected to risk of injury greater than their normal day-to-day 
activities. This course includes a visit to range safety facilities at Cape Canaveral Air Force 
Station and Kennedy Space Center and is normally only given at this location. If you wish to 
discuss presenting the class at your location, please contact the NASA Safety Training Center 
staff. 
Target Audience: Senior, program, and project managers; Safety, Reliability, Quality, and 
Maintainability professionals with an interest in range safety activities
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Range Flight Safety Analysis 
The Range Flight Safety Analysis course provides a detailed understanding of range safety 
analysis. It includes NASA, Federal Aviation Administration, and Department of Defense 
requirements for flight safety analysis; a discussion of range operations hazards, risk criteria, 
and risk management processes; and an in-depth coverage of the containment and risk 
management analyses performed for expendable launch vehicles at the Eastern Range. 
Although the course is based on expendable launch vehicles at the Eastern Range, the overall 
analysis process and concepts are applicable to other vehicles and other ranges as well. The 
course concentrates on debris hazards and analyses but includes an overview of toxic, blast, 
and radiation analyses. The course includes a class exercise that covers the entire analysis 
process. 
Prerequisite: NSTC 074, Range Safety Orientation or equivalent experience (engineering 
degree and a background in range safety) 
Target Audience: NASA, Federal Aviation Administration, and Department of Defense Range 
Safety Analysts; range safety personnel in other disciplines; and program/project managers and 
engineers who design potentially hazardous systems to operate on a range 
The Range Flight SafetyAnalysis course outline is shown in the graphic below.
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Range Flight Safety Systems 
The Range Flight Safety Systems course was taught for the first time at Kennedy Space Center 
in September of 2007 with 15 students in attendance. The course size is limited by tours we 
conduct at the Navy Trident trainer facility. The course describes required safety responsibilities 
and flight termination system procedures and plans. It also includes flight termination system 
component design, performance, test, and subsystem pre-launch requirements. 
The module then transitions to the applicable flight termination system ground support and 
monitoring equipment, flight termination system analysis, and component test history. The 
course continues with a review of unmanned aerial vehicle flight termination systems, balloon 
universal termination packages, and the enhanced flight termination system. The class ends 
with a description of the autonomous flight safety system. 
Prerequisites: NSTC 074, Range Safety Orientation or equivalent level of experience or 
training, is required; NSTC 002, System Safety Fundamentals or NSTC 008, System Safety 
Workshop, is recommended 
Target Audience: NASA, Federal Aviation Administration, and Department of Defense Range 
Safety Personnel working Flight Safety Systems issues; range safety personnel in other 
disciplines; program/project managers and engineers who design potentially hazardous systems 
to operate on a range; personnel who conduct hazardous operations on a range.
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Range Flight Safety Operations Course 
The Range Flight Safety Operations course was completed in early 2007 and the pilot course 
conducted in February with representatives from NASA Headquarters, Kennedy Space Center, 
Wallops Flight Facility, Dryden Flight Research Center, and Federal Aviation Administration in 
attendance. The first official course was held in July 2007. Unlike previous courses, this course 
is only taught at Wallops Flight Facility to take advantage of its range safety and control room 
facilities, as well as the mobile range safety system assets. 
To ensure mission success and the safety of operations for the range, a formal process has 
evolved among the different ranges to provide range safety operations. As you can see from the 
outline below, this course focuses on the roles and responsibilities of the Range Safety Officer 
for range safety operations, as well as real-time support, including pre-launch, launch, flight, 
landing, and required mitigation actions. Launch commit criteria, mission rules, countdown 
activities, and display techniques are presented. 
Tracking and telemetry, post operations, lessons learned, and the use and importance of 
contingency plans are discussed. Those participating in the course receive hands-on simulator 
training and exercises to reinforce techniques and procedures to successfully conduct launch 
operations. Due to the unique interaction with real-world equipment, a maximum of six students 
may attend each class. The course centers on the topics shown in the graphic below. 
Range Safety Operations 
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If you wish to attend any of the courses offered, please contact your Center training manager, or 
refer to the NSTC web site course catalogue located at: 
http:IIwww6. jsc. nasa.gov/safety/calendar/NSTC/Docs/2008 Catalog .doc
Page 6 of 6
NASA Range Safety Program
2007 Annual Report 
Constellation Tailoring 
With the Constellation Program ramping up efforts to support a 2009 ARIES 1 -X test flight, the 
tailoring of range safety requirements has begun. The program is required to meet the 
combined requirements of NPR 8715.5; Range Safety Program, and Air Force Space 
Command Manual (AFSPCMAN) 91-710; Range Safety User Requirements. To better support 
the program, the Air Force and NASA, through the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel, 
have combined efforts and developed one document that includes the complete set of range 
safety requirements. 
A draft version of the tailored ARIES 1-X Range Safety Flight Test Vehicle Mission document is 
complete with final signatures expected in mid 2008. The new document codifies the philosophy 
of shared responsibility for all aspects of range safety between the Air Force and NASA and will 
serve as the foundation for future tailoring efforts between the two organizations. With few 
exceptions, the requirements contained in the tailored range safety document mirror the 
requirements of both the Air Force and NASA documents. 
The Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel agreed to use some design characteristics of 
heritage flight termination systems that may not be in compliance with all AFSPCMAN 91-710 
requirements, but meet the current flight termination system requirements of the Space Shuttle 
Program. In particular, the launch vehicle fails to incorporate redundancy in a few components, 
mainly the linear-shaped charge and safe and arm device. 
The limited physical separation of other redundant components also deviates from the 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 requirements. The panel agreed to these deviations based on the many 
successful flights of similar flight termination configurations flown on Shuttle solid rocket 
boosters. Other minor flight termination system deviations that meet the Space Shuttle Program 
flight termination system requirements have been approved through the panel. A vast 
improvement over the Shuttle flight termination system design incorporates the addition of an aft 
segment linear-shaped charge, which should significantly lower public safety risk. 
Development of a tailored document to support the ARIES 1 launch vehicle (shown below) is 
also underway. Many of the FTS non-compliances with the AFSPCMAN 91-71 0/NPR 8715.5 
baselines will be eliminated for ARIES 1. It is anticipated this document will also incorporate the 
philosophy of shared range safety responsibility between the Air Force and NASA.
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According to NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, a variance is documented and approved 
permission to perform some act or operation contrary to established requirements and tailoring, 
deviations, and waivers are types of variances. The variance process for operations at Kennedy 
Space Center and Vandenberg Air Force Base is outlined in KDP-KSC-P-3829, signed in June 
of 2006. 
The objective of the process is to effectively apply the NASA procedural review process with 
consideration given to the unique relationships between NASA/Kennedy Space Center and the 
301h and 45th Space Wings. Each of the Space Wings has their own processes, and the KDP 
outlines how the NASA/Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative meets the intent 
of NPR 8715.5 with regard to variances. 
Listed below are the definitions of terms as they currently exist in the NPR: 
• Tailoring. The process where the authority responsible for a set of range safety 
requirements (e.g., the Independent Technical Authority for technical requirements) and the 
range user review each requirement and jointly document whether or not the requirement is 
applicable and, if it is applicable, whether or not the range user will meet the requirementas 
written or achieve an equivalent level of safety through an acceptable alternative. Tailoring 
includes the approval of deviations. Tailoring does not include the approval of waivers, 
which are addressed by a separate process. 
• Deviation. A variance that authorizes departure from a particular safety requirement that 
does not strictly apply or where the intent of the requirement is being met through alternate 
means that provide an equivalent level of safety. 
• Waiver. A variance that authorizes departure from a specific safety requirement where an 
increase in risk, due to the fact that the requirement is not satisfied, has been documented 
and accepted by the appropriate authority. 
Although these definitions and process are used for new range safety related variances for both 
the Shuttle and the Launch Service Program, changes to both terminology and process are 
being vetted for the Constellation and other future programs. Additionally, NPR 8715.5 is 
currently being reviewed to determine if changes are needed to effectively operate the variance 
process NASA wide. 
The most notable change being discussed is the use of the term variance. This term may no 
longer be used as an inclusive term for tailoring, waivers, and deviations. In the future, the terms 
waiver and exception (equivalent level of safety) may be used. This is a NASA-wide initiative to 
ensure commonality throughout the agency and to have NASA terminology that is more 
consistent with the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation Administration. 
A waiver will be required when there is rationale for not meeting a requirement as written. This 
includes meeting the intent, exceeding the requirement, or not meeting the requirement and 
may or may not be a change in risk. The rationale will be documented and agreed to on the 
waiver form.
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When a waiver is brought forward due to increased risk to the public, workforce, and/or 
property, the "burden of proof" or rationale for acceptance and approval of the increased risk is 
on the entity bringing forward the request. The waiver will not be approved without acceptable 
rationale. With that in mind, the entity bringing the waiver forward should use available expertise 
to help determine the following: 
The rationale is reasonable. 
• Hazard mitigation is in place. 
• A get well plan is available to correct the noncompliance. 
Today, the NASA Range Safety Manager is the waiver approval authority for all range safety 
related variances for NASA launches where there is not a range safety office. For launches at 
the Western Range, the Program accepts the increased risk, and for launches at Kennedy 
Space Center, this responsibility falls on the Kennedy Space Center Center Director and the 
program manager. But with the proposed changes, all NPR requirements are being reviewed to 
determine the appropriate level for approval, so the current approval and acceptance authorities 
may change for future programs. The current NASA Range Safety Variance process is shown in 
the flowpath below.
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OBJECTIVES: 
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- Comply with INASA Range Safety 
Program requirements
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/
START
KSC Range Safety 
Manager 
Meet to discuss/determine 
merits of deviation/waiver.
Candidates for attending the meeting:
SMA Director/Designee, applicable SMA 
Division Chief 
Ir
Note 3. 
- Appropriate SMA Division and KSC Range 
Safety Manager will participate in and"or review 
tailoring process between program/contractor 
and the range (30th or 45th SW.) 
- Appropriate SMA Division and KSC Range 
Safety Manager will have authority to approve 
Meets Intent Cetification (EWR 127-1), 
Deviation (NASA), or Equivalent Level of Safety 
(91 -7101 non -compliances. 
Note 5: 
SMA Division representative and/or trusted 
agent will provide NAS with copies of approved 
documentation. 
Note 6: 
Acceptance/Acceptance with 
Comments wIl be annotated on the NASA 
Range Safety noncompliance form by 
each party. Any non-concurrence or 
Concerns shah he annotated on NASA 
Range Safety noncompliance form. Non-
concurrence issues will be addressed by 
NRS through the non-concurring office, 
SMA Division and sent deck to the Safety 
Divisiorvl<SC Range Safety for further	 - 
action as dictated by the Safety 
Director/Designee, KSC Range Safety 	 - 
Manager and SMA Division Chief after 
discussion with NRS. 
Note 7:	 - 
Center Director accepts waver for 
Eastern Range launches only. Program 
will determine final disposition for Western 
Range launches. 
Safety	 Program	 icer' Center Director 
-- -----------------------	 --
1) Safety & Mission Assurance 
(SMA) Division Chief or designee 
notified of or aware of 
NASA/Contractor vanance, 
noncompliance or need for technical 
support	 OR 
2) NASA Range Safely (NRS) 
notified of or aware of Eastern or 
Western Range (EWR) variance, 
noncompliance or need for technical - 
support (See Note 1 & 2) 
V 
SMA Division, Launch 
Services Program (VA), and 
- NRS interface on issue(s) 
(See Note 3) 
V 
NRS will inform LSP of NRS
status of variances in wOrk. 
(See Note 2) 
V 
"issue Meets Intent 
- '
	 Cortificaion (MIC), 	 ",	 No 
Deviation (NASA) or  
Equivalent Level of 
Safety (ELS)? 
-	
Yes 
V 
Note 1' 
NRS Consists of the NASA Range 
Safety Manager (NRS) and Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC) Range Safety 
Manager. 
Note 2: 
Parallels/mirrors the current variance 
process between the launch services 
contractors (LSC) and the 30thI4Eth 
SW Range and is not meant to 
aupercede or replace current 
processes. 
Note 4: 
The SMA Division respresentative (With 
support from NRS and/or KSC Range 
Safety Manager) 
• Obtain required signatures on the 
NASA Range Safety non-compliance 
form. 
- Discuss acceptance consideration 
with Center Director 
- Present approved non-compliances 
(and rationale) at safety and program 
reviews (SARA, SMSRR, LVRR, 
FRR, LRR) 
- NAS to ensure documentation is 
maintained and recorded 
SMA Division and KSC Range
Safety Manager sign MIC, ELS
or deviation (NASA definition)
after consult/notification to NAS. 
(Note 5) 
SMA Division and KSC
Range Safety 
Manager review deviations
(EWR 127-1 definition), and
waivers and provide
recommendation 
(Note 4) 
A A
NASA Range 
V	 Manager(NRS) Yes 
//	
•".,,,	 Yes	 -	 ".,	 -.	 .' Apt No	 Concur ". 	
- " Approve "-'- -	 '-,,	 Waiver?	 ,> (Note 5)	 Waiver?	 y	 Note
te 7 No Yes 
No 
Paq ir 1 of I
Review
- Director/Program 4
non-acceptance. 
Report results/status at Safety Readiness Reviews (SARA), 
Sa)ety and Mission Success Reviews 1SMSR), Launch Vehicle 
Readiness Reviews LVRR), Flight Readiness Reviews (FRR) 4 
and/or Launch Readiness Reviews (LRR) and notify Chief, 
OSMA and OCE prior to launch.
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The objectives of the range safety risk process, KDP-KSC-P-3628, for managing range safety 
risks for launch and entry at Kennedy Space Center are to ensure the safety of the Kennedy 
Space Center workforce and visitors during launches, to comply with KCA 1305, the 
Memorandum of Understanding for Range Safety between Kennedy Space Center, the Space 
Shuttle Program Office, and the 45th Space Wing, and to comply with NPR 8715.5, Range 
Safety Program, requirements. The process also outlines the requirements for the Kennedy 
Space Center risk assessment board should additional mitigation action be required to reduce 
risk to an acceptable level for launch and landing operations. 
Definitions 
The baseline definition for risk is the combination of the two criteria listed below: 
1. The probability (qualitative or quantitative) that a program will experience an undesired 
event such as cost overrun, schedule slippage, safety mishap, or failure to achieve a 
needed technological breakthrough; and 
2. The consequences, impact, or severity of the undesired event were it to occur. 
For Range Safety, risk is expressed as casualty expectation, a measure that takes into 
consideration both the probability of occurrence and the consequence of a hazard to a 
population or installation. Risk is measured in the same units as the consequence, such as 
number of injuries, fatalities, or dollar loss. 
For the purposes of range safety risk management, the public includes visitors and personnel 
inside and outside NASA-controlled property who may be on land, on waterborne vessels, or in 
aircraft. This category does not include center essential personnel. 
Center essential personnel are government or contractor personnel who perform functions 
necessary for continued operations at a NASA Center or other site where NASA has control and 
responsibility. For a specific range operation, the center essential personnel include a workforce 
subset referred to as mission essential personnel. 
Mission essential personnel are government or contractor personnel who are directly involved in 
ensuring the safety and success of range operations associated with a mission. This category 
does not include any crew on board a spacecraft. 
Range Safety Analysis 
With these definitions in mind, each range operation undergoes a range safety analysis to 
establish any design or operational constraints needed to control risk to people and property. 
Once the analysis is complete, Range Safety assesses the analysis and provides additional 
mitigation or suggests acceptance of increased risk, if required. 
Launch Risk Notification 
Approximately two weeks before a launch, Kennedy Space Center Program Office and Kennedy 
Space Center Range Safety Manager receive a Launch Risk Notification letter from the 4S" 
Space Wing. This letter serves as documentation of results from risk analysis performed for the 
mission. The launch risk evaluation includes hazards resulting from launch vehicle debris 
impact, distant focusing overpressure, and toxic effluent dispersions, with respect to population 
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and facility input data. If the risk meets acceptable criteria in NPR 8715.5, the results are 
documented and the launch will proceed. 
Convening of the Space Flight Risk Assessment Board 
If the risk exceeds acceptable criteria in NPR 8715.5, the Center Director has the discretion to 
convene a Space Flight Risk Assessment Board. The board consists of the following members: 
•	 Safety and Mission Assurance Director, Chair 
• Safety and Mission Assurance Deputy Director, Vice-Chair 
• NASA Range Safety Manager 
• Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Manager 
• Kennedy Space Center Chief Counsel 
• Launch Services Program (VA) Director 
•	 Launch Vehicle Processing (PH) Director 
• Cape Canaveral Spaceport Management Office (CCSMO) (JP) Director 
•	 Constellation Project (LX) Director 
•	 Launch Integration (MK) Director 
•	 Center Operations (TA) Director 
•	 International Space Station (ISS) and Spacecraft Processing (UB) Director 
•	 External Relations (XA) Director 
•	 Applied Technologies (KT) Director 
The Kennedy Space Center Center Director may choose not to convene a board if the risk has 
been minimized to the maximum extent possible and the risk is documented and accepted using 
the standard range safety variance process. However, if an Assessment Board is convened, a 
minimum of four topics must be presented to the board at least one week before the mission. 
• 45th Space Wing Safety Office or Johnson Space Center, Flight Design and Dynamics 
Office provides: 
- Assumptions in the analysis and calculation methodology 
Risk assessment results 
• Space Shuttle Program or Launch Services Program - provides program inputs 
•	 External Relations - presents visitor population numbers 
•	 Safety and Mission Assurance - provides mitigation options and the effect, if any, on the 
Risk Measure of Collective Casualty Expectation, E 
Risk Assessment Board Recommendations 
After receiving and reviewing all the information presented, the Assessment Board will make 
one of two recommendations to the NASA Range Safety Manager. 
1. Mitigate residual risk to an acceptable level, or
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2. Request the NASA Range Safety Manager to waive residual risk, with Center Director 
acceptance of the increased risk. 
If the risk can be mitigated, the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Manager will be notified 
and mitigation efforts will be documented and a copy forwarded to the Space Wing Chief of 
Safety and the NASA Range Safety Manager. However, if a waiver is required, the Kennedy 
Space Center Range Safety Manager will write the waiver and coordinate it for acceptance with 
the Program Manager and the Center Director. 
If neither the Program Manager nor the Center Director accepts the waiver, the issue will be 
sent back for further mitigation efforts. But once the waiver has been accepted, the Chief of the 
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance and Office of the Chief Engineer will be notified. 
Additionally, a copy of the approved waiver will be forwarded to the Space Wing Chief of Safety 
and the NASA Range Safety Manager and the mission will proceed with a clear understanding 
of the risks associated launch. 
Shuttle Landing Activities Process 
The process is similar for Shuttle landing activities with the exception that the risk analysis is 
performed by the Johnson Space Center, Flight Design and Dynamics Office, not the 45th 
Space Wing. Risk analysis data is forwarded to the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety 
Manager approximately two weeks before the scheduled landing of the Shuttle. This analysis is 
updated three days before landing and may be updated again one day before landing based on 
events such as a change in weather or extension of the mission. If the risks are deemed to be 
unacceptable, risk mitigation efforts will be implemented to help ensure the safety of the public 
and workforce before the Shuttle lands. 
A flowpath of the Kennedy Space Center space flight risk assessment process is shown in the 
graphic below.
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KSC Space Flight Risk Assessment Process Rev. Basic 
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'	 Range Perform
the Self Service Management Tool (or
Space Center/Flight Safety Risk equivalent) database, 
Design/Dynamics (CM) visitor and Provide	 Assessment and •	 XA Director will provide the number of 
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Range Safety Launch Support Policy 
NASA's policy for protecting public safety has become more definitive in recent years. In June of 
1997, NASA issued NPD 8700. 1, NASA Policy for Safety and Mission Success, which stated: 
It is NASA policy to avoid loss of life, personal injury or illness, property loss or damage, 
or environmental harm from any of its activities and assure safe and healthful conditions 
for persons working at or visiting NASA facilities. 
In October of 2002, NASA issued a revision to NPD 8700.1 (Revision C) providing an updated 
NASA policy stating: 
Protect the public, Astronauts and pilots, NASA workforce, and high-value equipment 
and property from potential harm as a result of NASA activities and operations by 
providing safe programs, technologies, operations, and facilities; and protect the 
environment. 
Until 2005, although policy to protect the public had been established, no guidelines on how to 
protect the public or to what levels were documented. In June 2005, NPR 8715.5, Range Safety 
Program, was signed by the Administrator and established policy with respect to public and 
workforce protection from range (launch) operations. The document focused on: 
• Compliance with minimum launch architecture and associated safety processes and 
procedures 
•	 Compliance with flight termination system requirements 
•	 Assessment of residual risks for safe and reliable operations 
•	 Acceptable risk criteria for general public and workforce 
•	 Establishing a variance process that identifies risk acceptors 
In previous annual reports, we've focused on how NASA Range Safety implements NASA range 
safety policy and explained the various Memorandums of Agreement and launch support policy 
letters that were developed with the Eastern and Western ranges in order for Range Safety to 
adequately support pre-launch, launch countdown, and post-launch activities. 
In 2007, NASA Range Safety began work on developing a change to the Space Shuttle 
Program launch commit criteria in an effort to implement the requirements of NPR 8715.5. 
Emphasis was placed on establishing a shared responsibility for range safety with the 45th 
Space Wing, establishing a real time variance process, and identifying appropriate countdown 
risk acceptors. 
Acceptable risk criteria consistent with the Range Safety Risk Management Plan for the Space 
Shuttle Program, vehicle tracking, and command requirements are also being added. The 
resulting proposed Launch Commit Criteria Change Notice will be worked through the Launch 
Commit Criteria Working Group in early 2008.
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We've also been very active in development of tailored requirements for the Constellation 
Program, as delineated in other included articles. Throughout 2008, we will continue to focus on 
preparation of launch commit criteria for the Constellation program that allows shared 
responsibility of range safety requirements as described in AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety 
User Requirements, and NPR 8715.5.
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NASA and Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Managers supported eight launches this year: 
one from the Western Range and six from the Eastern Range, including three Shuttle launches. 
Additionally, the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Manager assisted with the Missile 
Defense Agency's near field infrared experiment (NFIRE) satellite launch at Wallops Flight 
Facility, primarily providing support for distant focusing overpressure analysis. 
To ensure the requirements of NPR 8715.5, NASA Range Safety Program, are met during pre-
launch, launch, and post-launch operations, NASA Range Safety personnel work side by side 
with our Department of Defense counterparts in the Eastern Range or Western Range 
Operations Control Centers. NASA Range Safety personnel ensure any range safety related 
activities that could have an impact on NASA launch criteria are relayed to the NASA Safety and 
Program officials to ensure we fly safely and within the requirements identified in NASA safety 
directives. 
NASA Range Safety personnel work with the supporting ranges many weeks in advance of 
each launch to coordinate support console positions and develop launch support documentation 
and safety briefings. NASA Range Safety personnel conduct briefings regarding NASA range 
safety operations and functions at Safety Readiness Reviews and other significant pre-launch 
venues. The efforts to plan, negotiate, and coordinate pre-launch and launch requirements and 
documentation in 2006 paid great dividends for support in 2007. 
Today, NASA Range Safety receives the same documents used by the range Mission Flight 
Control Officer's and Safety Technical Advisors. The documents that are received from the 
Range include: 
• Space Wing waivers and variances 
• Launch Support Plan (Range Countdown Checklist) 
• Mission Flight Control Officer Countdown Checklist 
• Estimated Coverage Plans for instrumentation 
• Flight Control Instrumentation Worksheet 
• Range Safety Operations Requirements and Supplements 
• General and special Mission Rules used during the launch countdown. 
With timely and more concise information, a launch abort or scrub may be avoided, saving time 
and money. However, the most important aspect of this cooperative effort is the fact that this 
type of partnership is the best way to do business when it comes to ensuring public safety. 
Another major effort undertaken before each launch is processing any exceptions to policy that 
may arise. This activity is explained in more detail in the Range Safety Launch Support Policy 
section. We've included an article in this section that details NASA Range Safety support to the 
NFIRE mission at Wallops Flight Facility.
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As we look forward to 2008, the Eastern and Western ranges will launch a total of ten 
expendable vehicles, including a Pegasus launch from Kwajalein Atoll. We anticipate supporting 
five Shuttle launches as well, so 2008 looks to be a busy year with almost double the number of 
launches supported in 2007.
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In early 2004, the Range Safety Group of the Range Commanders Council initiated Phase II of 
a Risk and Lethality Commonality Team effort to revise RCC 321, Common Risk Criteria for 
National Test Ranges. The acceptable risk criteria defined in NASA Procedural Requirements 
NPR 8715.5; Range Safety Program, is based on the guidance provided by this document. 
Because injury criteria were not defined during Phase I of the Risk and Lethality Commonality 
Team effort, the Department of Defense major range and test facility bases have diverged from 
use of the standard since it addresses acceptable risk criteria pertaining only to fatalities. 
Establishing Risk Criteria Based on Casualties 
The second phase of the Risk and Lethality Commonality Team effort has focused on 
establishing acceptable risk criteria based on casualties. The Range Safety Group also 
recommended that RCC 321 be updated and expanded to include flight safety hazards in 
addition to inert debris. The second phase of the Risk and Lethality Commonality Team was 
initially established as an ad hoc committee under the Range Safety Group. However, after a 
few meetings, the identification of additional risk-related topics and the more detailed 
development of tasks, the need for a standing committee was realized. 
In February 2005, the Risk and Lethality Commonality Team was renamed the Risk Committee 
with a specific objective to rewrite RCC 321. In 2007, the Risk Committee was formally 
recognized as a standing committee by the Range Safety Group. Over the last four years, the 
committee has focused on establishing updated acceptable risk criterion and developing 
detailed supporting rationale for inert debris and other range hazards, including distant focusing 
overpressure and toxics. The group has also decided to establish an aggregated risk criterion, 
evaluating the combination of all launch hazard risk against one acceptable level. Current 
practice consists of evaluating each hazard against hazard unique criterion. 
Update of RCC 321, Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges 
In June of 2007, RCC 321-07 was officially issued through the Range Commanders Council. 
Updates to the document included the following: 
•	 Risk acceptability criteria and supporting rationale for additional flight safety hazards and 
consequences potentially generated by range operations 
•	 The major activities required to conduct the entire risk management process and 
considerations to address hazards beyond just inert debris 
•	 Top-level requirements for computational models used to analyze the risks posed by inert 
and explosive debris 
•	 Updated hazard thresholds for inert and explosive debris, as well as screening criteria for 
other hazards including toxics, distant focusing overpressure, and ionizing and non-ionizing 
radiation 
•	 Factors and considerations for acceptable debris risk assessment models
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Additional Topics Requiring Discussion 
During the revised document development effort and through discussions at Risk Committee 
meetings, the group has identified a number of additional topics that require discussion. 
Following review by the Range Commanders Council Executive Committee, approved topics will 
be addressed by the committee and guidance provided in upcoming revisions to RCC-321. The 
topics include: 
• State of the art review of risk uncertainty and catastrophe aversion and development of 
approaches to launch risk uncertainty for application to risk acceptability. A state-of-the-art 
review of how industries and governments which have technological endeavors that could 
produce high risk to the public deal with the uncertainties from their risk assessments and 
also with the quantification of catastrophe potential. 
•	 Treatment of conditional risk criteria for foreseeable conditions. Development of guidelines 
and rationale for modeling the risk from controlled activities such as flight termination 
action, engine shutdown, and use of alternative flight paths for reusable launch vehicle 
aborts. 
•	 Asset protection. Establishment of roles, responsibilities, guidelines, and criteria for the 
protection of critical assets. 
•	 Responsibility for satellite protection beyond orbital insertion. Establishment of roles and 
responsibilities for satellite tracking beyond orbital insertion and for unmanned space 
systems. 
• Space craft protection for exo-atmospheric and orbital debris hazards. Development of 
•	 consensus criteria and characteristics for analyses used to address exo-atmospheric and 
orbital debris hazard risk to space craft. 
•	 Business jet vulnerability criteria. Development of vulnerability thresholds and modeling 
characteristics for assessment of transoceanic business class jets. 
• Mitigation of large numbers of minor injuries. Investigate the need to develop acceptable 
risk criteria and/or mitigation guidelines for minor injuries such as those resulting primarily 
from toxics and explosive debris. 
• Reusable launch vehicle and other controlled reentry related issues. Development of policy 
and guidelines for range operations involving reusable launch vehicles and reentry issues 
associated with any vehicle. 
• Hazard threshold for land vehicles. Development of hazard thresholds to protect land 
vehicles such as automobiles, buses, trucks, and trains from shock waves from explosions 
and impacting debris. 
Submittal of the above tasks has been completed with Executive Committee review anticipated 
in January 2008.
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The Flight Termination Systems Committee provides a forum for all issues and technologies 
related to flight termination systems. Members from several different ranges support this effort 
and come together to discuss various flight termination issues and concerns that need to be 
addressed. Some of the major efforts and issues that the committee discussed in 2007 included 
the following: 
• RCC 319, Flight Termination Systems Commonality Standard rewrite 
• The enhanced flight termination system 
• The autonomous flight safety system/autonomous flight termination system 
• Frequency interference 
• National Security Agency. High Alphabet decertification 
RCC 319, Flight Termthat,on Systems Commonality Standard 
RCC 319 was revised to include new technologies and lessons learned that were used to 
update and clarify various flight termination system requirements. This task began in 2003. The 
standard was completed and released in 2007. 
Enhanced Flight Termination System 
A major topic of discussion in 2007 was the enhanced flight termination system. Members of the 
Flight Termination Systems Committee supported various testing and operations associated 
with this program in 2007 and continue to play an important role in developing this system. 
Some of the issues the committee is working on are listed below: 
• The process for communicating with possible new vendors wishing to design enhanced 
flight termination system receivers and/or ground equipment 
• How the enhanced flight termination system will be incorporated into RCC 319 
• How the enhanced flight termination system will affect RCC 313, Test Standards for Flight 
Termination Receivers/Decoders 
Many milestones were accomplished this year as the enhanced flight termination system 
continues to progress toward becoming a certified system while the committee continues to 
support this program and its endeavors. 
Autonomous Flight Safety System/Autonomous Flight Termination System 
The committee also discussed various uses and implementations of the autonomous flight 
safety system/autonomous flight termination system. Right now, there is no plan to use this 
system on any of the major ranges. More testing and qualification will have to be done on this 
technology before the ranges will consider using it.
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Frequency Interference 
Frequency interference is still a major concern at several ranges. There is still some concern 
with PAVE PAWS radars located at Beale Air Force Base in California and at Cape Cod in 
Massachusetts. However, through coordination with these operators, a mitigation effort has 
been used for all launches from the Eastern and Western ranges. 
At other missile ranges, the enhanced position location reporting system is also a major 
concern. Along with other organizations, the Flight Termination Systems Committee is working 
hard to come up with a viable, long-term solution to the frequency interference issue. 
National Security Agency High Alphabet Decertification 
Another issue that has been discussed recently is the decision to decertify High Alphabet as a 
secure system. Today High Alphabet is the most secure flight termination system available. 
However, the National Security Agency has stated a desire to move toward a more secure and 
encrypted system. 
High Alphabet is used on numerous launch vehicles around the country and those programs will 
be forced to move to a new system if High Alphabet is decertified. As of now, the National 
Security Agency has stated that they will no longer support High Alphabet after 1 January 2015. 
The Flight Termination Systems Committee will be working with ranges and programs to help 
provide a smooth transition and ensure that range operations are not adversely affected during 
this timeframe. 
Flight Termination Systems Committee Meetings 
During 2007, the Flight Termination Systems Committee participated in two meeting held by the 
Range Commanders Council, Range Safety Group. The meetings took place in June in Florida 
and in November in New Mexico. Topics discussed are presented below. 
June Recap 
In June, the Flight Termination Systems Committee met at the Range Safety Group meeting at 
Patrick Air Force Base to discuss ongoing issues relevant to flight termination systems. The 
main topic of discussion was the enhanced flight termination system. Major milestones 
accomplished by the program as well as future applications and implementation of the system 
were discussed. Members of the enhanced flight termination system program presented the 
status and future of the program to the committee. 
Other topics discussed were the release of RCC 319, Flight Termination Systems Commonality 
Standard, the autonomous flight termination system/autonomous flight safety system, frequency 
interference at various ranges, and National System Agency decertification of the High Alphabet 
system.
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November Recap 
At the November meeting in Albuquerque, the Flight Termination Systems Committee discussed 
ongoing issues relevant to flight termination systems. Once again, the main topic of discussion 
was the enhanced flight termination system. The current status of the program as well as future 
milestones and applications were presented. Other topics discussed included emerging 
unmanned aerial vehicle programs and the impacts to RCC 319, Herley flight termination 
system receiver issues, and directed energy applications and their impact on flight termination 
system components and requirements.
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Range Safety Group Meeting Recap 
Founded in 1951, the Range Commanders Council is dedicated to serving the technical and 
operational needs of the United States test, training, and operational ranges. The council was 
organized to preserve and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of member ranges, thereby 
increasing their research and development, operational test and evaluation, and training and 
readiness capabilities. 
The Range Commanders Council provides a framework wherein common needs are identified 
and common solutions are sought, technical standards are established and disseminated, joint 
procurement opportunities are explored, technical and equipment exchanges are facilitated, and 
advanced concepts and technical innovations are assessed and their potential applications 
identified. 
As an associate member, NASA maintains active participation in the Range Commanders 
Council and many of its working groups, including the Range Safety Group. 
Member Ranges 
Members include Army, Navy, Air Force, and DOE ranges. Their locations are shown in the 
graphic below and identified in the following table.
, 
* 
*
*Army	 '*'Air Force	 Navy	 DOE
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Locations of Member Ranges 
Air Force	 Navy Army 
Aberdeen Test Center, 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
Aberdeen, MD 
Dugway Proving Ground, 
Dugway, UT
30th Space Wing, 
Vandenberg Air Force 
Base, CA 
45th Space Wing, Patrick 
Air Force Base, FL
NAVAIR Atlantic Ranges, 
Patuxent River, MD 
NAVAIR Pacific Ranges, 
China Lake and Point 
Mugu, CA 
Naval Undersea Warfare 
Center Division Keyport, 
Keyport, WA 
Naval Undersea Warfare 
Center Division Newport, 
Newport, RI
Department of Energy 
Department of Energy 
Nevada Test Site 
Electronic Proving Ground, Ft Air Armament Center, 
Huachuca, AZ	 Eglin Air Force Base, FL 
National Training Center,	 Air Force Flight Test 
Fort Irwin, CA	 Center, Edwards Air Force 
Base, CA 
Reagan Test Site, APO AP	 Arnold Engineering	 Pacific Missile Range 
Development Center,	 Facility, Kekaha, HI 
Tullahoma, TN 
White Sands Missile Range, 	 Goldwater Range, Luke Air 
White Sands, NM	 Force Base, AZ 
Yuma Proving Ground, 
Yuma, AZ 
Range Safety Group 
Through standardization, development, and continuous improvement, the Range Safety Group 
of the Range Commanders Council supports the safe conduct of hazardous operations on the 
test, training, and operational ranges and related facilities. Hazardous operations include, but 
are not limited to, ordnance and expendable releases, directed energy and laser operations, 
missile flight, space launch and reentry, unmanned vehicle operation, gunfire, explosive use, 
and hazardous emissions. 
100th Meeting of the Range Commanders Council Range Safety Group 
The 100th meeting of the Range Safety Group was hosted by the 45th Space Wing Safety Office 
at Patrick Air Force Base. The meeting was held in Indialantic, Florida from June 5 through June 
7. This conference included a number of special topics briefings, including: 
• Demo-2 test flight of the autonomous flight safety system 
• Unmanned aerospace vehicle and systems range safety requirements document 
development 
• Directed energy test and evaluation capability 
• Range reports from all participating Major Range Test Facility Bases 
NASA provided range safety related training status reports and range reports for Kennedy 
Space Center, Wallops Flight Facility, and Dryden Flight Research Center. The Flight
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Range Safety Group Meeting Recap 
Termination Systems Committee and Risk Committee also met. NASA participated in the 
meetings of both these committees. 
Flight Termination Systems Committee Meeting 
The Flight Termination Systems Committee met at Patrick Air Force Base to discuss ongoing 
issues relevant to flight termination systems. The main topic of discussion was the enhanced 
flight termination system. Major milestones accomplished by the program as well as future 
applications and implementation of the enhanced flight termination system were discussed. 
Members of the enhanced flight termination system program presented the status and future of 
the program to the committee. Other topics discussed were the release of RCC 319, Flight 
Termination Systems Commonality Standard, autonomous flight termination 
system/autonomous flight safety system, frequency interference at various ranges, and National 
Security Agency decertification of the High Alphabet system. 
Risk Committee Meeting 
During the Range Safety Group meeting, the Risk Committee selected a new chairperson, Mr. 
Paul Rosati from the 45th Space Wing. The primary focus of the Risk Committee was the 
determination of task proposals to the Range Commanders Council for 2008. All task proposals 
were briefed, and it was decided to submit the following task proposals to create or expand on 
risk criteria in RCC 321-07, Common Risk Criteria Standards for National Test Ranges: 
• Risk Committee Secretariat Position 
• State of the art review of risk uncertainty and catastrophe aversion and development of 
approaches to launch risk uncertainty for application to risk acceptability 
• Treatment of conditional risk criteria for foreseeable conditions 
• Asset protection 
• Responsibility for satellite protection beyond orbital insertion and space craft protection for 
exo-atmospheric and orbital debris hazards 
• Business jet vulnerability criteria 
• Mitigation of large numbers of minor injuries 
• Reusable launch vehicle and other controlled reentry related issues 
• Hazard threshold for land vehicles 
• Toxic concentration levels for toxic hazard corridors 
• Voluntary public risk 
101" Meeting of the Range Commanders Council Range Safety Group 
Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico hosted the 101st meeting of the Range 
Commanders Council Range Safety Group, held November 27 through 29. This conference included a 
special topic briefing on Sandia National Laboratories and range reports from all participating Major 
Range Test Facility Bases, as well as a session for the Flight Termination Systems Committee. The Risk 
Committee did not meet during this session.
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Range Safety Group Meeting Recap 
NASA provided range safety related training status reports and range reports to the group for Kennedy 
Space Center, Wallops Flight Facility, and Dryden Flight Research Center and participated on the Flight 
Termination Systems Committee during this session. 
The Flight Termination Systems Committee discussed ongoing issues relevant to flight termination 
systems. The main topic of discussion was the enhanced flight termination system. An overview of the 
system, as well as improvements and enhancements by the program were discussed. Additionally, future 
applications and implementation of the system were briefed. 
Other briefings included the following: 
• Directed energy and flight termination system requirements 
•	 Herley Industries flight termination receiver 60-1 issues and requalification processes 
• Emerging unmanned aerial vehicle programs and RCC-319 
• Enhanced flight termination system documentation and concept of operations 
• Enhanced flight termination system database discussion focusing on range identifications and other 
command fields 
The discussion about range identifications brought to light the possibility of using the Flight Termination 
Systems Committee as the clearinghouse for issuing enhanced flight termination system range 
identifications and perhaps vehicle identifications. It was determined that more discussion was necessary 
before the committee would undertake this task.
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Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) 
The Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration Common Standards Working Group is an 
interagency partnership established to develop, publish, and maintain Air Force and the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation common 
launch safety requirements and practices to protect the public during launch and re-entry 
operations. 
The charter for the Common Standards Working Group implemented the Memorandum of 
Agreement Between the Department of the Air Force and Federal Administration on Safety for 
Space Transportation and Range Activities and related matters at the direction of the Senior 
Steering Group. The memorandum, dated 16 January 2001, stated that the Air Force and the 
Federal Aviation Administration would work together to achieve common safety requirements for 
launches. 
The tangible benefits from the creation of common safety standards include a stable framework 
of safety requirements for the U.S. space launch industry and minimal administrative burdens 
for the government and commercial sectors. Another welcome by-product is the creation of a 
system of checks and balances between the two agencies. 
Senior Steering Group 
The Senior Steering Group provides senior executive leadership and guidance to the Common 
Standards Working Group to accomplish its objectives. The Senior Steering Group meets semi-
annually, or more frequently as needed, and is composed of the following: 
• The Federal Aviation Administration Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 
Transportation 
• The Director of National Security Space Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force 
• The Director of Space Operations and Integration, Headquarters United States Air Force 
• The Director of Air and Space Operations, Headquarters Air Force Space Command 
• The 14th Air Force Commander 
The co-chairs of the Senior Steering Group determine the meetings of the Common Standards 
Working Group. 
Working Group 
The Common Standards Working Group is a government-only forum. Commercial launch 
industry representatives are not permitted to participate due to the Department of Transportation 
policy regarding rulemaking. Membership in the group consists of representatives of the Air 
Force and Federal Administration Association organizations that are responsible for the 
development and implementation of launch and re-entry safety requirements, practices, 
activities, and policies as well as representatives from other agencies as identified by the Senior 
Steering Group co-chairs. Representatives from the agencies listed below are current members 
of the working group.
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Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) 
14th Air Force, Safety, A3 
30th Space Wing, Safety 
t 45th Space Wing, Safety 
Air Force Space Command, Safety (A3, A5) 
Air Force Safety Center 
Federal Aviation Administration, Associate Administrator for Commercial Space 
Transportation 
• Headquarters United States Air Force (A30-S) 
Secretary of the Air Force 
• Space and Missile Center (Safety and Launch and Range Systems Wing) 
NASA, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Missile Defense Agency are also current 
members of the group. Although not a formal member, NASA Range Safety has been an 
integral part of the Common Standards Working Group since 2004, providing range safety 
insight and professional technical expertise on numerous issues for subgroups that formulate, 
recommend, and evaluate range safety policies and procedures. 
Evolution of Range Safety Policy and Procedures 
The figure below shows the evolution of the major safety documents from EWR 127-1 to the 91 
document series generated by the Common Standards Working Group. The status of the 
documents is discussed in the topics following the figure. 
Evolution of EWR 127-1 to the 91 Series 
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Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration 
Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) 
Past Accomplishments 
The Common Standards Working Group has made significant progress since its inception, 
drafting and publishing the following Air Force documents: 
o Launch Safety Program Policy (AFSPCI-91-701), May 2004 
o Range Safety User Requirements (AFSPCMAN 91-710), July 2004 
o Launch Safety Requirements for AFSPC Organizations (AFSPCMAN 91-711), February 
2007 
Additionally, the Federal Aviation Administration, in conjunction with the Common Standards 
Working Group, issued its first Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in October 2000. The agency 
then issued a supplemental notice in July 2002 and published and posted its second 
supplemental notice in 2003. Along with the new rule, the Common Standards Working Group 
also developed a Launch Safety Site Assessment and a Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Federal Aviation Administration and the Air Force for resolving requests for relief 
from common launch safety requirements. 
Also, in 2003, the working group agreed on a framework for determining probabilities of failure 
for new expendable launch vehicles. The group established a list of factors that are 
requirements and practices used by the Federal Aviation Administration and the Air Force to 
protect public safety during launch and re-entry. The Federal Aviation Administration 
requirements have been codified in 14 Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter lii. 
Since the vehicles in question were new with little existing empirical data, it was determined that 
initial evaluations would be conducted based in part on data from vehicles developed and 
launched under similar circumstances. An independent assessment of the proposed 
requirements and methods was conducted, and the Common Standards Working Group 
published the final guidelines in 2004. 
Current Projects 
The Common Standards Working Group and its subgroups are currently working on the 
following projects. 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 
AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements, is being updated. The document was 
distributed to industry, NASA, and Air Force Space Command organizations for review and 
comment in order to update the July 2004 version. Consolidated comments have been received 
with the review and update process scheduled for a 2008/2009 timeframe. 
AFSPCMAN 91-712 
Headquarters Air Force Space Command Safety will revise and combine the computer and 
software requirements for Range Users (currently in AFSPCMAN 91-710) and the computer and 
software requirements for Range Operators and Acquirers into a single document.
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Common Standards Working Group (CSWG) 
These requirements will be published as AFSPCMAN 91-712, Range Software and Computing 
System Requirements. Space Command convened the Software Subgroup to develop and 
coordinate these requirements. 
The draft computer and software requirements have been sent to industry, Range Users 
(including NASA), and Range Operators and Acquirers for review and comment. After 
Headquarters Air Force Space Command Safety review, the comments will be provided to the 
Federal Aviation Administration for review. Both the Air Force and the Federal Aviation 
Administration want to ensure that the software requirements remain common between the two 
agencies. This document is scheduled for publication in 2008. 
Reusable Launch Vehicles 
The Reusable Launch Vehicle Subgroup was formed in April 2006 to develop public safety 
requirements for the launch, reentry, and recovery of reusable launch vehicles. Membership in 
this group includes the Air Force and Federal Aviation Administration, with participation from 
NASA. The subgroup was formed for the following reasons: 
o When AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements, was released in July 2004, 
reusable launch vehicle requirements had not been adequately addressed. 
o The potential for near-term reusable launch vehicle users (SpaceX and the Air Force's 
Orbital Test Vehicle) on Space Command ranges has resulted in requests for guidance from 
the Safety Offices of the 301h and 451h Space Wings in their efforts to aid potential users in 
their vehicle designs. 
o The flight of Spaceship One showed that entrepreneurs developing reusable launch vehicles 
are becoming a reality. 
o The Space Shuttle Columbia accident revealed that safety concerns for the public during 
launch vehicle reentry needed to be addressed in more detail. 
The Reusable Launch Vehicle Subgroup meets weekly via teleconferences and is nearing the 
completion of development of public safety requirements for unmanned reusable launch 
vehicles. Estimated completion is November 2007. 
The development of manned reusable launch vehicle requirements will be initiated after the 
completion of the unmanned requirements. The estimated completion of the manned reusable 
launch vehicle requirements is November 2008. The reusable launch vehicles requirements will 
be incorporated into AFSPCMAN 91-710. 
As new and emerging space launch technologies surface, the Common Standards Working 
Group will continue to provide a forum through which the Air Force, the Federal Aviation 
Administration, NASA, and other government agencies can communicate on further 
development and implementation of common range safety standards. The goal of this group has 
been, and will always be, to maintain public safety in all phases of launch activities.
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Policy Development Update 
The development of unmanned aerospace systems is a rapidly 
evolving technology area. An evolution from drones and 
remotely piloted vehicles, these flight systems now encompass 
everything from hypersonic vehicles (shown right), to rotary 
wing hover systems (shown below), to lighter than air systems, 
and to any sort of hybrid imaginable - so long as the pilot is 
either not on board or the flight system is computer 
programmed.
These flight systems, with sizes ranging from housefly 
to full scale aircraft, are now being visualized for 
operations at all altitudes of the atmosphere and 
beyond and are much more than just flight hardware. 
Formerly referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles and 
inclusive of unmanned aircraft systems, the rapid 
evolution of unmanned aerospace systems continues 
to blur, alter, or make obsolete definitions of flight 
systems as their capabilities evolve into and between 
the domains of air, space, and near-space. 
Orbital, suborbital, and aircraft-like flight may possibly be integrated using combinations of 
ballistic, buoyant, or aerodynamic processes. As systems, these unmanned aerospace systems 
may include control stations, computers, human operators, remote sensing technology, 
communication and control links and relays, and Range Safety systems spanning the globe. 
In 2005, the NASA Applied Technology Directorate, the NASA Range Safety office, and the 
United States Air Force 45th Space Wing Safety Office formed a working group to address the 
range support and Range Safety issues for such diverse systems operating near the launch 
head of the Eastern Range. 
Development of Range Safety Requirements 
A major technical thrust since 2005 has been the development of Range Safety requirements 
specifically designed to address the unique risks at the Eastern Range, especially for unmanned 
aerospace system operations near the launch head. Such challenges include rocket plume 
effects on unmanned aerospace system flight hardware, additional risks from unmanned 
aerospace system accidents impacting highly volatile rocket propellant facilities, and application 
of risk management principles for the safety of personnel and public in relatively close proximity. 
To address these challenges, the working group conducted an extensive document review in 
2005-2006 to aid in determining the compulsory subtopics to be addressed in a requirements 
document and a flight operations manual. Once completed, an exhaustive outline was 
formulated and sections were assigned to personnel to develop requirements based on subject 
matter expertise.
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Policy Development Update 
The working group was further challenged to incorporate rapidly evolving operational concepts 
and current considerations for operating unmanned aerospace systems in the National 
Airspace. In 2007, this safety risk management process was significantly refined to also address 
mature operational unmanned aerospace systems. 
In 2007, technical interchanges expanded to include the Air Force Space Command Future 
Range Architecture Team, the NASA advanced range technology community, and the Range 
Commanders Council Range Safety Group. Development of a customer oriented Kennedy 
Space Center45th Space Wing concept of operations support process was initiated. In the midst 
of these developmental efforts, requests for unmanned aerospace system operations of varying 
maturities and risks were submitted to the Range causing accelerated attention to developing 
these unmanned aerospace system support processes. 
Technical Challenges 
Meanwhile, technical challenges remain. Of urgent significance is the need to consider 
alternative classifications of range safety systems or contingency management systems that 
can accommodate the diverse unmanned aerospace system operational situations that are 
quite different from rocket launch or piloted aircraft operations. 
Depending on risks involved, such systems might be of several reliability classes. Such systems 
may be challenged to operate over short to very long duration missions, be relatively 
inexpensive for expendable operations or stamina for repetitive operations, possibly micro-
miniaturized, or operate in environments spanning from Federal Aviation Administration 
controlled national airspace to remote operations in hostile combat arenas. 
Presently the aviation community is addressing the concerns of allowing unmanned aerospace 
system flight operations alongside airliners. Some unmanned aerospace systems are rapidly 
maturing, but before they become as safe and reliable as piloted aircraft, technologies must 
further evolve; for example, attention must be paid to the following: 
A reliable means to "sense and avoid" other planes 
New air-traffic control systems based on electronic rather than voice communications 
The ability to address and resolve in-flight unmanned aerospace system anomalies 
As unmanned aerospace systems continue to evolve, current definitions or paradigms for 
reusable launch vehicles, "fly-back" stages, and re-entering payloads from the ballistic launch 
community may need to be revised or melded. Paradigms of dedicated links and cyber systems 
for flight safety systems or flight control may soon be challenged by evolving network centric 
efficiencies supporting not only launch range, but also sustained unmanned aerospace system 
flight, and other operations yet to be considered. 
Along with the robust evolution of unmanned aerospace system technology, robust 
requirements must also address the synergistic overlap and melding of space, cyber, and 
unmanned aerial vehicle communities. The unmanned aerospace systems working group is 
striving for operational robustness to protect personnel, property, other aircraft, and national 
assets, while enabling new flight systems to operate with appropriately managed risk.
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Flight Safety System Challenges 
Range Safety is often faced with many challenges when trying to ensure the protection of the 
public, the local workforce, and property. These challenges must be met with steadfast 
determination and urgency to ensure that public safety and mission success are preserved. 
Some of the biggest issues NASA Range Safety dealt with in 2007 are discussed below. 
Constellation 
NASA Range Safety has been 
heavily involved in supporting 
the Constellation program. A 
major topic of concern in 2007 
was ensuring that the 
Constellation program would 
meet all applicable range safety 
requirements. NASA Range 
Safety met with Constellation 
program personnel, 45th Space 
Wing Safety personnel, and 
pertinent contractors to discuss 
flight termination system options 
for the Ares I vehicle shown right 
and all range safety 
requirements that the 
Constellation program must 
meet. 
This group met numerous times to review NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, and 
AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements. NPR 8715.5 is the NASA Range Safety 
program document while AFSPCMAN 91-710 is the range safety document used by the Eastern 
Range (45th Space Wing) for new programs. These documents contain range safety user 
requirements such as airborne flight safety system design, test, and documentation. This group 
is tailoring these documents to include only the requirements applicable to the Ares I program. 
This activity is close to completion and it is perceived that this same process will be used for the 
Ares V vehicle as well. NASA Range Safety will continue to work with this group and others to 
make sure all applicable range safety requirements are met to help ensure a safe and 
successful return to the moon and beyond. 
Frequency Migration 
Many different frequencies are used for flight termination. Each range uses a set of frequencies 
for flight termination operations. One of the frequencies that has been used for many years at 
various ranges, including the Eastern and Western ranges, is 416.5 megahertz. However, the 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration directed the Department of 
Defense to stop use of 416.5 megahertz for flight termination systems no later than the last day 
of calendar year 2006. The reason for the change was due to overcrowding in that frequency 
range and the fact that ultra high frequency wideband systems, such as flight termination 
systems, are required to operate in the 420-450 megahertz spectrum while 400-420 megahertz 
is reserved for narrow band systems.
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However, range users at the Eastern and Western ranges were not able to meet this mandate 
so both ranges requested "Exception to Policy" waivers for continued use of 416.5 megahertz. 
The Eastern Range received approval through 2010 for the fly-out of Shuttle only, while the 
Western Range received approval through 2008 for Missile Defense Agency launches only. All 
range users have agreed to migrate to 421 megahertz and have begun to transition. Therefore, 
the remaining launches scheduled to use 416.5 megahertz have been granted approval. 
The Eastern and Western ranges have also used 425 megahertz for quite some time, but due to 
the interference concern with high-powered radars, it was decided to phase out this frequency 
to minimize the impact of the radars. Users will be allowed to fly out remaining 425 megahertz 
receivers through 2008. After this date, they must use 421 megahertz as their flight termination 
frequency. 
Frequency Interference 
Some concern still remains over frequency 
interference between high-powered radars 
and flight termination system operations at 
the Eastern and Western ranges. High-
powered radars such as the PAVE PAWS 
radar have shown that they can interfere with 
flight termination receivers onboard a launch 
vehicle. These high-powered radars, like the 
one shown right at Clear Air Force Base in 
Alaska, operate in the 420-450 megahertz 
region, the same region that some flight 
termination receivers operate in. Much 
research has been done in the last year on 
these radars and their effect on flight 
termination receivers. The Eastern and 
Western ranges have enacted mitigation 
efforts during range operations to ensure that 
there is no interference. 
Long term solutions, such as moving to a new frequency band or using an autonomous flight 
safety system, are still being investigated. As long as the radar operators and range personnel 
agree to the mitigation efforts currently in place, an immediate long term decision is not likely. 
Autonomous Flight Safety System 
As in previous years, the autonomous flight safety system was a topic of concern for NASA 
Range Safety in 2007. As the range climate continues to change and evolve, so does the 
prospect for future technology. Research is being done on autonomous flight safety system now 
more than ever before to answer key questions about the system. Key concerns that range 
safety representatives are working include: 
Can this type of system and all relevant components meet applicable range safety 
requirements?
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• What kind of certification program and how much testing will this system need before it is 
deemed "certified" to fly alone or with command capability? 
• Can this type of system be man-rated and used for manned flight? 
Whether or not an autonomous flight safety system could be used for a NASA or NASA-
sponsored mission remains to be seen, but NASA Range Safety continues to work with other 
entities to come up with a viable go-forward plan for this technology and to ensure that this type 
of system will meet all range safety requirements and not add increased risk during range 
operations. 
Enhanced Flight Termination System 
NASA Range Safety has been involved in the enhanced flight termination system program for 
many years now. NASA Range Safety supported numerous meetings and teleconferences 
pertaining to the design, testing, and implementation of this system. Although there were 
several technical issues and problems that arose, 2007 was a year of milestones and 
accomplishment. 
In 2007, the enhanced flight termination system program completed qualification testing on the 
first set of receivers and also completed the first end-to-end demonstration of the system. The 
system performed successfully and all goals of the mission were satisfied. NASA Range Safety 
representation was present during this mission in order to gain a better understanding of 
enhanced flight termination system operations. With this successful mission, the enhanced flight 
termination system is on its way to becoming a legitimate, certified system. NASA Range Safety 
continues to be a part of the enhanced flight termination system program and provides technical 
support when needed. 
Secure Flight Termination System 
Presently, two different types of flight termination systems are in use: non-secure and secure. 
The secure system is known as High Alphabet and is used on most launch vehicles operating at 
the Eastern and Western ranges. However, after 2014 High Alphabet will no longer be available 
for use. 
The National Security Agency will de-certify High Alphabet as a secure system effective 1 
January 2015. The agency no longer views High Alphabet as a robust system viable for space 
launch applications and range operations. If a secure system is to be used for a mission, NASA 
and the Department of Defense are both bound by requirements that state a secure system 
must use National Security Agency-approved cryptography. Being that High Alphabet will no 
longer be National Security Agency approved, ranges and range users must transition to an 
alternative. 
Right now the only viable option is the enhanced flight termination system, a National Security 
Agency-approved, encrypted system. However, this system is very new and has little 
experience. To migrate to this new system, both ranges and range users must upgrade their 
equipment to support the enhanced flight termination system.
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The colored boxes shown below in the diagram of the enhanced flight termination system 
vehicle and ground systems are components that the ranges and range users must upgrade to 
support the enhanced flight termination system. NASA Range Safety will continue to work with 
range users and range personnel to make this transition as easy as possible. 
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Independent Assessment 
In accordance with NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, the NASA Range Safety Manager is 
required to conduct an independent assessment of applicable NASA Centers, component and 
range facilities, and programs at least once every two years to verify conformance with range 
safety policies, procedures, and requirements. NASA Range Safety has conducted audits at a 
number of facilities over the past few years, including Dryden Flight Research Center, Wallops 
Flight Facility, and the Goddard Center. 
Conduct of Audit 
In April of 2007, NASA Headquarters performed an Institutional/Facility/Operational Safety Audit 
at the Kennedy Space Center. 
Although this discussion focuses on the Range 
Safety aspects of the audit, other disciplines 
reviewed included the following: 
• Pressure Vessel Systems 
• Electrical Safety 
• Lifting and Handling Equipment 
• Fire Protection 
• Kennedy Space Center Government-

Industry Data Exchange Program. 
This safety audit satisfies the Range Safety 
Manager requirement for assessing Kennedy 
Space Center. 
Range Safety Audit Results 
The Range Safety portion of the audit focused on ensuring Kennedy Space Center compliance 
with the requirements of NPR 8715.5. Although the audit found Kennedy Space Center Range 
Safety to be in compliance with the document with no major deficiencies, a few items that 
require action are identified below. 
• Item: There is no Range Safety risk management plan for expendable launch vehicle 
launches as required by NPR 8715.5, paragraph 3.2.4.4. Corrective Action: Range Safety 
is working with the Launch Service Program to develop Range Safety risk management 
plans for expendable launch vehicles. 
• Item: KDP-KSC-P-3619, NASA Range Safety Variance (Waiver) process needs to be 
expanded to address the unique aspects of dealing with variance/waiver situations that can 
occur in real time during a launch countdown. Corrective Action: Range Safety has worked 
with headquarters to develop a real time process and to capture the process within a new 
revision of NPR 8715.5 which is expected in 2008. Range Safety is working locally with the 
Space Shuttle Program Launch Commit Criteria Working Group to develop a similar 
process. A similar process will be worked with the Launch Services Program.
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Item: KSC-PLN-2805, KSC Range Safety Risk Management Plan for Launch and Landing 
of the Space Shuttle, needs to be updated to fully describe how Kennedy Space Center 
manages toxics and distant focusing overpressure. A revision to NPR distant focus 
overpressure risks during Shuttle launches and to demonstrate how that approach satisfies 
the risk criteria of NPR 8715.5 is needed. Corrective Action: Range Safety is working with 
Kennedy Space Center, Center Operations to fully describe the risk mitigation efforts 
performed during a Space Shuttle launch countdwn and document how these processes 
lower overall risk estimates and aid in satisfying the acceptable risk criterion of NPR 8715.5. 
All corrective actions are expected to be completed in early to mid 2008.
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Common Risk Analysis Tool Kit Development 
As required by NPR 8715.5; Range Safety Program, each range operation (launch or flight) 
shall undergo a range safety analysis to establish any design or operational constraints needed 
to control risk to persons and property. To accomplish this task, each NASA center has 
developed analysis tools to estimate risk associated with different hazards. Risk models 
currently used by the centers were mostly developed by Range Safety support contractors 
according to their particular technical expertise and based on specific center requirements 
and/or concerns. Some of the existing models have had peer review but have not been 
subjected to an extensive validation and verification program. Most of the models also lack well 
defined configuration management requirements and user training programs. 
Purpose and Goal of Common Tool Kit Development 
The purpose of the common tool kit development is an attempt to better manage public safety 
risk models used by NASA and to consolidate development efforts and requirements for proper 
validation and verification and configuration management. The goal is to develop a suite of 
accepted models under formal configuration management and make them available to all 
centers. Training and certification on performing hazard analysis using the models, including the 
associated physics and acceptable risk levels, will be required. This effort should minimize 
duplication of development effort and provide ranges with expanded capability when necessary 
to evaluate new hazards. It will also somewhat standardize the analysis process and ultimately 
make analysts well versed in a particular type of hazard analysis available to other centers. 
Developing a Toolbench 
With larger and more varied launch programs being introduced, 
such as expendable launch vehicles, reusable launch vehicles, 
reentry vehicles, and in particular the Constellation program 
(see right), greater emphasis is being placed on risk 
management and the use of rigorously validated and verified 
risk models. 
In 2007, the Constellation Program funded a task to develop an updated debris risk analysis 
tool. The task is intended to evaluate the current suite of Space Shuttle/expendable launch 
vehicle launch area and overflight debris risk models and their associated sub-models to 
determine how they can be improved and integrated into a government owned and operated 
risk analysis tool. 
The "toolbench" will have an open systems architecure that will provide economies in upgrading 
hardware, modifying existing models, interfacing new models when new or enhanced 
capabilities are required, and sharing physics and data modules between risk models. The 
toolbench will be managed with formal processes for verification, validation and acceptance, 
and configuration management and user training/certification. A requirements document, 
outlining modeling capabilities, validation and acceptance, and configuration management has 
been completed.
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Initial Focus 
Evaluations of existing capabilities and proposals on both system 
architecture and new physics model development will begin in early 
2008. Although initial development will focus on supporting ARES 1 
debris risk analysis at the Eastern Range, plans are to expand toolkit 
capability to include other hazards (such as toxics and distant focusing 
overpressure), other launch vehicles (expendable launch vehicles), 
unmanned aerial vehicles, other phases of flight (descent), and other 
centers and ranges.
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Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Support of Toxics and Distant Focusing 
Overpressure Evaluations 
On April 24, 2007, an Air Force Minotaur 1 rocket was successfully 
launched at 2:48 AM EDT from NASA's Wallops Flight Facility in 
Virginia. The launch took place from the Mid-Atlantic Regional 
Spaceport's launch pad on the south end of Wallops Island. Click 
NFIRE launch video to view the actual launch. 
This launch was the second Minotaur 1 launch from Wallops in just 
over four months. The previous mission on December 16, 2006, 
carried the Air Force Research Laboratory's TacSat-2 satellite. 
The Rocket 
The four-stage Minotaur 1 shown below carried the Department of Defense, Missile Defense 
Agency's near field infrared experiment (NFIRE) satellite. The Orbital Suborbital Program 
Minotaur 1 launch vehicle consists of an M-55(51,514 pounds) and SR-19 (13,740 pounds) first 
and second stages taken from the Minuteman-2. Upper stages consist of an Orion 50XL motor 
and Orion 38 motor, both of Pegasus heritage.
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Near Field Infrared Experiment 
Although launch vehicles of significant size 
(including the vehicle used for the TacSat-2 
mission) have been launched from Wallops 
Flight Facility in the past, this was the 
second time Wallops performed a detailed 
analysis of toxic and overpressure hazards. 
A Tier 1, or screening evaluation of the 
TacSat-2 mission performed by the 45th 
Space Wing, revealed an in-depth toxics and 
distant focusing overpressure analysis was 
required. 
The close proximity of the Minotaur 1 launch 
vehicle (with over 65,000 pounds of solid 
rocket propellant) to the off-base public was 
the driving factor behind the need for more 
detailed analysis. Based on the large 
number of data requirements, first time 
evaluation of these hazards required a 
significant effort. 
65,76 IN. DIA	 Based on acceptable risk criteria contained 
in NPR 8715.5; Range Safety Program, pre-
517)	 launch and day-of-launch risk analysis must 
be performed for all expendable launch 
vehicles launched from Wallops Flight 
Facility. 
NFIRE Mission Support 
Kennedy Space Center Range Safety has gained a great deal of experience in evaluating toxic 
and distant focusing overpressure at the Eastern Range and has assisted Wallops in the 
development, coordination, and real-time support of these hazard evaluations. 
For the NFIRE mission, Kennedy Space Center Range Safety support to launch day operations 
consisted of coordinating with the 45th Space Wing to provide real-time toxic and distant 
focusing overpressure modeling support and coordinating with ACTA Inc to provide 
meteorological and technical support. 
The 45th Space Wing and ACTA Inc provided significant support to the effort by conducting the 
real-time analysis as well as training Wallops Range Safety personnel on toxic and distant 
focusing overpressure modeling techniques.
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Dryden Flight Research Facility Missions 
Date	 Project Name Mission 
6/23/2007	 lkhana	 Ferry Flight
(Predator B) 
07/20/2007 X-48B LSV 
(Blended Wing 
Body) 
7/30/2007 X-48B LSV 
7/30/2007 lkhana 
7/31/2007 lkhana 
8/02/2007 X-48B LSV 
8/03/2007 lkhana 
8/08/2007 X-48B LSV 
8/09/2007 lkhana 
8/13/2007 X-48B LSV 
8/16/2007 lkhana 
8/28/2007	 X-48B LSV 
8/29/2007	 lkhana 
9/07/2007 lkhana 
9/19/2007 Ikhana 
9/27/2007 lkhana
10/03/2007	 lkhana 
10/04/2007	 lkhana 
10/11/2007	 lkhana 
10/24/2007	 lkhana 
10/25/2007	 lkhana 
10/26/2007	 lkhana 
10/28/2007	 lkhana
Flight
Duration Mission 
(Hours) Location Result 
1.6 From Gray Success 
Butte/Palm dale, 
CA to Edwards 
AFB 
0.5 Edwards AFB Success 
Edwards AFB Success 
Edwards AFB Success 
Edwards AFB Success 
Edwards AFB Success 
Edwards AFB Success 
Edwards AFB Success 
Edwards AFB Success 
Edwards AFB Success 
Edwards AFB; Success 
Central and 
Northern CA 
Edwards AFB Success 
14 Edwards AFB; CA; Success 
NV; UT; ID; MT; 
WY 
14 Edwards AFB; CA; Success 
OR; WA 
2 Edwards AFB Success 
10 Edwards AFB; Success 
Central and 
Northern CA 
2 Edwards AFB Success 
2.5 Edwards AFB Success 
3 Edwards AFB Success 
9 Edwards AFB; Success 
Southern CA 
9 Edwards AFB; Success 
Southern CA 
9 Edwards AFB; Success 
Southern CA 
9 Edwards AFB; Success 
Southern CA
Flight# 1 
Flight #2 
Pilot Training Flight # 
1 
Pilot Training Flight # 
2 
Flight #3 
Pod Checkout Fight 
#1 
Flight #4 
Pod Checkout Fight # 
2 
Flight #5 
Western States Fire 
Mission Flight # 1 
Flight #6 
Western States Fire 
Mission Flight # 2 
Western States Fire 
Mission Flight # 3 
Functional Check 
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Performance Flight 
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Western States Fire 
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Western States Fire 
Mission Flight # 6 
Western States Fire 
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Western States Fire 
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Wallops Flight Facility Launches for 2007 
Date 
1/19 
1/19 
1/19 
1/19 
2/14 
2/14 
2/14 
2/14 
2/14 
2/14 
2/28 
4/24 
I 5/22 
6/21 
8/3 
8/6 
8/13 
I 9/6 
lh1l6 
111/14 
111/14
Vehicle 
21.138 UE Black BrantVB 
36.234 UE Black Brant IX 
41.064 UE Terrier-Orion 
41.065 UE Terrier-Orion 
40.020 UE Black Brant XII 
DRW-4531 BQM-74 
DRW-4623 BQM-74 
41.061 UE Terrier-Orion 
41.062 UE Terrier-Orion 
41.063 UE Terrier-Orion 
35.037 UE Black Brant X 
40.019 UE Black Brant XII 
DRW-3741 NFIRE 
USAF FALCON V 
12.059 CT Terrier MK 12 Improved 
Orion 
41.069 UE Terrier-Orion 
41.070 UE Terrier-Orion 
36.220 UG Black Brant IX 
41.055 Terrier Mk70-
Improved Orion 
36.218 UE Black Brant IX 
36.241 GS Black Brant IX 
DRW-4657 BQM-34 
DRW-4658 BQM-34
Location 
Poker Flat Research Range, Alaska 
Poker Flat Research Range, Alaska 
Poker Flat Research Range, Alaska 
Poker Flat Research Range, Alaska 
Poker Flat Research Range, Alaska 
Wallops Flight Facility 
Wallops Flight Facility 
Poker Flat Research Range, Alaska 
Poker Flat Research Range, Alaska 
Poker Flat Research Range, Alaska 
Poker Flat Research Range, Alaska 
Poker Flat Research Range, Alaska 
Wallops Flight Facility 
Wallops Flight Facility 
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 
Andoya, Norway 
Andoya, Norway 
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 
Wallops Flight Facility 
Wallops Flight Facility 
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 
Wallops Flight Facility 
Wallops Flight Facility
Launch 
Result 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Partial* 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Success: 
Success 
Success 
Failure 
Success 
Success 
Success 
Success 
*Partial  success-experiment failure
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Wallops Flight Facility Balloon Program Missions 2007 
Date Agencies Involved Location Result. 
Winter Gorham/U. Hawaii Antarctica Success 
Devlin/U. Penn Antarctica [Success 
Rust/J H U-APL Antarctica
Ops Success 
Science Failure 
Stachnic, Jucks/JPL, Harvard Kiruna, Sweden Success 
Toon/JPL Kiruna, Sweden Ops Failure 
Spring FairbrotheriWFF Fort Sumner, New Mexico Success 
Ramsey/MSFC Fort Sumner, New Mexico Success 
Zych/UC Riverside Fort Sumner, New Mexico Success 
FairbrotherlWFF Fort Sumner, New Mexico Success 
Summer
McConnell, Fairbrother/U. New 
Hampshire, WFF Palestine, Texas Success 
Fairbrother/WFF Palestine, Texas Abort 
Clem, Juneau/U. Delaware, CSBF Palestine, Texas Success 
Martin, CALTECH Palestine, Texas Success 
Fall Fairbrother/WFF Fort Sumner, New Mexico Success 
Guzik/LSU Fort Sumner, New Mexico Success 
Bernasconi/JHU-AP, Traub/JPL Fort Sumner, New Mexico Success 
Margitan/JPL Fort Sumner, New Mexico Success 
Knolker HAO NCAR Fort Sumner, New Mexico Success
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Eastern and Western Range Launches 
KSC Launches 
DATE VEHICLE MISSION LAUNCH SITE 
17-Feb Delta II THEMIS ER/NASA 
8-Mar Atlas V STP-1 ER/NASA 
25-Apr Pegasus AIM WR/NASA 
7-Jun Delta II
COSMO SkyMed 
I WRJComm 
8-Jun Shuttle Atlantis STS-1 17 KSC 
15-Jun Atlas V NROL-30 ER/DoD 
4-Aug Delta II PHOENIX ER/NASA 
8-Aug Shuttle Endeavour STS-1 18 KSC 
18-Sep Delta II World View 1 WR/Comm 
27-Sep Delta II DAWN ER/NASA 
10-Oct Atlas V WGS Fl ER/DoD 
17-Oct Delta II GPS 2R-17 (M4) ER/DoD 
23-Oct Shuttle Discovery STS-1 20 KSC 
10-Nov Delta IV H DSP 23 ER/DoD 
5-Dec Atlas V NROL-24 ER/DoD 
8-Dec Delta II
COSMO-Sky 
Med 2 WR/Comm 
20-Dec Delta II GPS 2R-18 (M5) ER/DoD
Additional 
Support 
I	 24-Apr	 I	 Minotaur	 I	 NFIRE	 WFF/DoD
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Autonomous Flight Safety System - Phase Ill 
The autonomous flight safety system is an independent and autonomous flight termination 
subsystem intended for expendable launch vehicles. It uses tracking and attitude data from an 
onboard GPS and inertial measurement unit sensors and configurable rule-based algorithms to 
make flight termination decisions. The system is a joint Kennedy Space Center and Wallops 
Flight Facility project. 
The autonomous flight safety system testing and development philosophy is a graduated 
approach, emphasizing bench tests and flight tests of incremental system changes using 
available resources and clearly defined objectives. Data from each test is carefully analyzed and 
used to identify the current system's performance and any problems that need to be resolved 
before changes are made. 
The ultimate objectives of the autonomous flight safety system are to increase capabilities by 
allowing launches from locations that do not have existing range safety infrastructure, reduce 
costs by eliminating some downrange tracking and communications assets, and increase safety 
by reducing the reaction time for flight termination decisions. 
First Test Flight—White Sands Missile Range 2006 
The autonomous flight safety system first flew 
on the Terrier Improved-Orion, two-stage 
sounding rocket shown right at White Sands 
Missile Range on April 5, 2006. A single-
chassis, dual-processor, dual-GPS system 
was used. 
Purpose of Flight. The primary purpose of 
the flight was to demonstrate the key 
elements of the autonomous flight safety 
system concept of operations pertaining to 
pre-launch set-up (loading and verifying the 
application and configuration files), bench 
testing, vehicle integration, in-vehicle end-to-
end testing, countdown system verification
.fr 
LI 
procedures, and flight operations. A secondary purpose was to gather lessons learned which 
could be codified into the Autonomous Flight Safety System System Level Requirements 
document currently under revision. 
Test. The test incorporated redundant GPS sensors and used two independently programmed 
processors. One was loaded with a nominal trajectory and the other programmed with artificial 
rules under which the nominal flight would violate safety parameters and provoke termination 
commands. The autonomous flight safety system was not connected to actual explosives. The 
system functioned and reacted correctly during the entire flight from launch to parachute 
deployment. 
Mission Rules. Two different sets of mission rules were developed for this test, one for each 
processor. The set for Processor 1 (designated as the nominal processor) was configured so that a 
nominal flight would not result in any flight termination actions. The set for Processor 2 (designated as 
Page 1 of 5
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the errant processor) included three additional rules so that multiple destruct activations would occur 
during a nominal flight. The autonomous flight safety system was not connected to a flight termination 
system and it could not initiate any destruct actions. 
The prelaunch success criteria of loading and verifying the application and configuration files 
and verifying that the applications were running correctly using simulated sensor data were 
satisfied. The rocket behaved nominally and the software performed as expected. The nominal 
processor did not execute any unplanned destruct actions and the errant processor successfully 
initiated three destruct actions as planned. 
The Ashtec G12 GPS receiver lost lock on liftoff and did not regain it until after the flight was 
over. The Javad GPS receiver maintained lock throughout the flight. Both processors were 
operational during the flight and provided navigation and status messages via the vehicle 
telemetry stream. Navigation and status messages were stored in the nominal processor's 
nonvolatile (flash) memory for the entire operation, but the errant processor's flash memory chip 
became partially dislodged during the flight and stopped recording at T+335 seconds. 
Otherwise, the hardware performed as expected. 
Second Test Flight—Kwajalein Reagan Test Site 2007
An autonomous fight safety system 
developmental test article flew on the 
SpaceX Falcon 1 expendable launch 
vehicle from the Kwajalein/Reagan Test 
Site on March 21, 2007. The primary test 
item was a single autonomous fight safety 
system chassis containing redundant flight 
processors, a custom-built voting circuit 
known as the command and switching 
interlock circuit, a power supply module, 
and a GPS receiver. An externally 
mounted GPS receiver for navigation 
solution redundancy and a 10-Watt Low-
Cost Tracking and Data Relay System 
(TDRS) Transceiver (LCT2) for a space-
based range demonstration were also 
flown. 
The Falcon I, shown right, is a two-stage, 
liquid oxygen and rocket-grade, kerosene-
powered launch vehicle designed to 
achieve substantial improvements in 
reliability and cost and to deliver 480 
kilograms (1058 pounds) to an orbit of 200 
kilometers at 28.5 0 inclination. The first 
stage is almost entirely reusable and 
returns via parachute to a water landing. 
Lift-off weight for the standard Falcon I is 
approximately 27,000 kilograms (60,000
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pounds), length is about 22 meters (70 
feet) and diameter is 1.67 meters (5.5 
feet). 
Minimum Success Criteria 
The minimum success criteria for this test were met and included the following: 
• Power-up, configure, verify configuration and test both flight processors and the command 
and switching interlock circuit during countdown operations. 
• Acquire and maintain a navigation solution on the internal GPS throughout the terminal 
countdown. 
• Maintain at least one GPS navigation solution throughout all portions of flight where the 
GPS antenna axis had a positive elevation angle. Correlate all GPS outages with 
unfavorable antenna attitudes using the vehicle attitude data. 
• Confirm proper application of Green Time destruct rule for portions of the trajectory with 
insufficient GPS coverage. 
• Maintain sufficient telemetry data coverage from launch to orbit insertion (100 kilometer 
perigee) to transmit valid navigation data from at least one GPS receiver and mission rule 
evaluation status from at least one processor. Telemetry outages are permissible; however, 
there must be coverage over 50 percent of the flight time with outages that do not exceed 10 
seconds in duration. 
Evaluate the full set of mission rules on at least one processor from launch to orbit insertion. 
Test Configuration. The test article was configured with a telemetry link from each of the two 
flight processors within the autonomous flight safety system chassis. The link from flight 
processor 0 (FPO) was routed through the Falcon 1 line-of-sight telemetry system. The link from 
flight processor 1 (FP1) was routed through the LCT2. Despite the previous successful 
completion of compatibility testing with launch vehicle systems, a concern was raised on launch 
day that LCT2 could potentially interfere with the vehicle GPS. With insufficient time available to 
permit additional conclusive testing, a decision was made by the Falcon 1 launch management 
team to fly with the LCT2 powered off. As a result, detailed mission rule response data was not 
available from FP1 for post-test analysis. 
Test Results. The telemetry data integrity from FPO was satisfactory throughout the entire 
flight, with no data dropouts prior to L+6 minutes. From L+6 minutes through the remainder of 
the propulsive phase of flight, there were 8 telemetry dropouts less than 0.3-seconds in 
duration. The GPS receiver housed within the autonomous flight safety system chassis 
maintained a navigation solution throughout the flight with no observed dropouts. 
Both GPS receivers maintained navigation solutions throughout the flight with four observed 
momentary dropouts experienced after the onset of the vehicle anomaly. The autonomous flight 
safety system sensor redundancy management algorithms were able to properly cross-compare 
the two solutions and supply navigation data to the onboard range safety algorithm modules 
throughout the flight. The voting circuit properly responded to commands from the two flight 
processors throughout the flight.
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The autonomous flight safety system properly detected lift-off and enabled the appropriate flight 
termination mission rules. A test exclusion zone was included in the mission rule set to simulate 
a flight termination event in the nominally planned vehicle trajectory. Both flight processors 
properly issued and released ARM and FIRE commands to the voting circuit when the vehicle 
instantaneous impact point intruded and exited the test exclusion zone. Both processors issued 
ARM and FIRE functions associated with the anomalous vehicle performance experienced 
during flight. Using the available telemetry data, it was confirmed that the FPO termination 
command was issued due to a violation of a moving-gate rule established to catch erratic flight 
from "in-plane" vehicle failures. 
Post-Flight Analysis. During post-flight analysis, a number of'anomalies were observed and 
investigated. Shortly after launch, an anomaly in the navigation solution issued by the externally 
housed GPS receiver caused FPO to improperly flag stage 1 burnout and stage 2 ignition 
events. Stage 2 ignition was flagged at T+18.0 seconds when it really occurred at T+176 
seconds. 
The GPS solution anomaly was traced to marginal satellites swapping in and out of track. This 
was a known vulnerability for this test article, and an attempt was made in the mission rule 
design to decouple all of the flight termination rules from in-flight detection of staging events to 
prevent spurious event detections from affecting the processing of mission rules. In the future, 
acceleration data from one or more inertial measurement units will be used for in-flight ignition 
and burnout event detection. 
Both processors issued ARM and FIRE functions when it was expected that the moving-gate 
would have overtaken the instantaneous impact point because of anomalous flight conditions. 
FP1 issued ARM/FIRE commands approximately 163 seconds after FPO issued its commands 
for the moving-gate rule. This lack of synchronization was caused by a set-up error in the 
configuration of the second stage moving-gate rule that resulted in the use of the elapsed time 
from second stage ignition as the time reference for the tabulated gate coordinates instead of 
time from launch in combination with the erroneous stage 2 ignition detection by FPO. 
Comprehensive Minimum Success Criteria. In spite of these anomalies, all of the established 
minimum success criteria noted above were met. Moreover, two of the three comprehensive 
success criteria given below were met: 
1. All Minimum Success Criteria are met. 
2. Sufficient telemetry data exists to show that all hardware and software configuration items 
within the autonomous flight safety system RT4 chassis functioned properly through 
countdown, launch, and the entire propulsive phase of flight. This includes verification of 
proper functioning of the two flight processors, the command and switching interlock circuit, 
and the internal GPS. 
3. A navigation solution was maintained on any GPS through enough of the propulsive phase 
of flight to avoid a Green-Time destruct violation. 
Criterion 2 could not be met because the LCT2 was the only path for telemeter detailed status 
data from FP1.
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Results of Rocket Tests 
The results of these rocket tests has led to improvements in the autonomous flight safety 
system design concept and the general functional requirements set for autonomous flight 
termination. Work continues on improving the autonomous flight safety system by making the 
chassis more rugged, formalizing the requirements and design, and adding a loosely coupled 
GPS/lnertial Navigation Solution to improve the reliability of the autonomous flight safety system 
sensor suite. 
A prototype of this GPS/lnertial Navigation Solution was flown on an Fl 04 at Kennedy Space 
Center on November 8, 2007. The equipment was integrated on the F104 and recovered 
undamaged, but the GPS receiver did not function properly for reasons still being investigated. 
Consequently, insufficient data was collected to determine how the GPS/ Inertial Navigation 
Solution system performed. A second set of flights is planned for January 2008.
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Joint Advanced Range Safety System 
The joint advanced range safety system is a collaborative effort between Dryden Flight Research 
Center and the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base to develop a state-of-the-
art mission planning, risk analysis, and risk management tool for range safety. The Range Safety 
organizations from all Major Range and Test Facility Bases are being asked to support the 
development, testing, and operation of unmanned aerial vehicles and reusable launch vehicles. It 
is the vision that the joint advanced range safety system will provide range safety support for 
these missions. 
Primary System Elements 
The joint advanced range safety system consists of two primary elements: a mission analysis 
software tool and the real-time operations tool. The mission analysis software tool quantifies the 
range safety risk for a given flight path and its associated vehicle parameters using a 
computerized method. This method will streamline the range safety analysis process by 
providing a consistent, high fidelity solution in less time than required by present methods of 
analysis. 
Additionally, the real-time operations tool will provide the Range Safety Officer with near real-
time assessment of the range safety risks during flight. This capability has many possible 
applications for the unmanned aerial vehicle or reusable launch vehicle operator, including the 
following: 
• Assessment of unmanned aerial vehicle overflight of populated areas 
• Allowing extended flight of an anomalous vehicle 
• Recovery of an off-nominal vehicle at an alternate landing site 
• Selection of an alternate flight or entry path 
Status 
The joint advanced range safety system mission analysis software tool is nearing operational 
status. Training of Dryden Flight Research Center, Air Force Flight Test Center, and 30th Space 
Wing Range Safety analysts has occurred. Dryden analysts are in the process of comparing test 
case results run on the mission analysis tool versus the results run by other methods. Other 
accomplishments include the creation of an interface control document for users who would like 
to develop their own modules and a new graphics tool to display results. 
The joint advanced range safety system mission analysis software tool will not be undergoing an 
independent software assurance assessment due to lack of funding. The 30th Space Wing is 
currently leading the effort to begin work on the joint advanced range safety system real-time 
operations tool and the development of tools for re-entry risk analysis.
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The 45th Space Wing is leading an effort to develop tools specific for the launch mission at the 
Eastern Range. Johnson Space Center is currently working to integrate the Public Entry Risk 
Assessment tool onto the joint advanced range safety system toolbench. The Center developed 
the Public Entry Risk Assessment tool in-house to analyze the risk posed by Space Shuttle re-
entry trajectories.
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Eastern Range Instrumentation Update 
The Eastern Range is the launch head at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, which also 
supports Kennedy Space Center launches. Range Management activities are hosted at Patrick 
Air Force Base under the command of the 45th Space Wing. Downrange sites include Jonathan 
Dickinson Missile Tracking Annex, Wallops Flight Facility, and Antigua, Argentia, and Ascension 
stations. In the context of space launch operations, the Eastern Range includes all of the 
surrounding air, sea, and land space that is within the range of any particular launch vehicle. 
(See the graphic below.) The Eastern Range is not part of NASA but supports NASA activities. 
Primary Objective of the Eastern Range 
The primary objective of the Eastern Range is to provide for the safety of the public during 
launch operations. The activities and resources to ensure safety of flight include range 
instrumentation, infrastructure, and scheduling required to support and ensure that space and 
ballistic launches and other operations are appropriately supported. 
The Eastern Range Range Safety Program uses instrumentation that is comprised of legacy 
and state-of-the-art technologies to ensure launch mission safety, launch area safety, and 
launch complex safety. Range instrumentation is primarily at the Florida locations of Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station and Patrick Air Force Base. The Eastern Range also uses 
instrumentation from other Department of Defense and NASA agencies to accomplish its 
mission.
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Information Provided by Instrumentation 
During launch operations, Eastern Range 
instrumentation provides vehicle positioning 
information from radar, vehicle telemetry, and optic 
tracking systems. Additionally, telemetry also 
provides vehicle health and status through its data 
stream. This range safety critical data is shipped via 
the range communication CORE network to the 
range safety display strings located in the Range 
Operations Control Center at Cape Canaveral Air 
Station. The Range Operations Control Center is 
shown at the left. 
Range Safety Displays 
The current range safety displays are designated as Flight Operations Version One (FOV1) and 
located at the Range Operations Control Center. The FOV1 system provides an Eastern Range 
range safety function and monitors launch vehicle performance. FOV1 consists of two 
independent systems: FOV1-A and FOV1-B. The systems acquire and process instrumentation 
data from the Eastern Range, NASA, and off-range sites through redundant network paths. 
Using the instrumentation data, these systems generate flight path and predicted impact point 
displays similar to the one shown below. 
Using these displays, the 
Mission Flight Control Office 
determines risk based on pr,-; 
defined mission rules and, if 
required, destroys any vehicle 
that violates those rules. The 45 
Space Wing Safety Office 
personnel devise these mission 
rules to ensure public safety 
from any errant launch vehicle 
incident. This is the primary 
Eastern Range function. 
FOV1 is constantly going 
through upgrade and 
development efforts. The fix-it-
second development effort was 
completed in early 2007. The fix-
it-third upgrades will be 
completed in 2008.
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Command Destruct System 
During launch operations, the 45th Space Wing is responsible for and ensures public safety 
through the use of a network of ground-based command destruct systems and vehicle-based 
flight termination systems. The two Eastern Range launch corridors are supported by 
downrange command transmitter sites that are geographically located along the flight path 
trajectory. This provides positive vehicle control throughout powered flight or orbit insertion. 
The Mission Flight Control Officer monitors 
real time vehicle performance from the FOV 
Range Safety displays. (See right) 
If a vehicle anomaly violates mission flight 
rules, the Mission Flight Control Officer 
initiates flight termination commands to the 
vehicle flight termination system by activating 
the central command remoting system (CCRS) 
located in the Range Operations Control 
Center. 
The central command remoting system  
generates and formats the digital command 
messages, then transmits the message to the 
applicable command transmitter (CT) site. 
The site then re-formats the message and uplinks the message to the vehicle. This is 
accomplished by the use of high power transmitters that generate a radio frequency carrier 
wave that is received by the vehicle flight termination system (FTS). The graphic below shows 
how the command destruct system works. 
Notional 
Command 
Destruct 
System 
The command destruct ground system is constantly going through upgrade and development 
efforts. The 45th Space Wing Safety Office monitors all development activity to ensure this 
instrumentation meets or exceeds system requirements.
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Post-Detect Telemetry System 
The premier Eastern Range launch vehicle telemetry acquisition system is the post-detect 
telemetry system. This system provides transport of digital post-detect telemetry data from 
Eastern Range telemetry sites via the Network CORE System Wide Area Network Interface 
Units and the microwave and commercial circuits from Jonathan Dickinson Missile Tracking 
Annex.
Post-detect telemetry system sites 
include Tel-4 at Kennedy Space 
Center (shown at left), Jonathan 
Dickinson Missile Tracking Annex, 
Wallops Flight Facility, Antigua, and 
Ascension. The post-detect telemetry 
data is transported to the launch 
customer facilities and the Range 
Operations Control Center (FOV1) for 
range safety purposes. 
In 2006, the developer updated post-detect telemetry system software to Version 3.1 to provide 
resolution of deficiency reports generated before post-detect telemetry system initial 
acceptance. 
INTEL SATCOM System 
The INTELSAT SATCOM system now consists of two separate 
SATCOM strings: A Side and B Side. SATCOM A provides the 
transport for the post-detect telemetry system telemetry data. 
This new digital communication transport service is the Eastern 
Range secondary telemetry and transport management system 
circuit transport carrier from the downrange stations of Antigua
	 m4m and Ascension to the Range Operations Control Center. Thecontrol center antenna is shown at right. 
Wide Area Network Interface Units 
The Network CORE Wide Area Network Interface Units facilitate the transport of data to Range 
Safety and telemetry data end users. The CORE provides the communication backbone at 
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station. The CORE consists of four rings, two OC-48 (2488 megabits 
per second) and two OC-12 (622 megabits per second). The communication link to NASA is 
through the Launch Operations Control Center. The primary nodes are the Range Operations 
Control Center, XY Facility, Southwest Terminal Building, and the East Terminal Building. 
Central Telemetry Processing System 
The central telemetry processing system is used for the processing, distribution, and display of 
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Range Safety telemetry data during the powered flight portion of Eastern Range launches. Post-
detect data streams into the central telemetry processing system where it undergoes frame 
synchronization and decommutation. The resulting telemetry parameters are used to generate 
4.8 kilobits per second range safety outputs. This 4.8 kilobits per second data is forwarded to 
the FOV1 system for further processing and display. 
Replacing the Cyber 860 Mainframe Computers 
Many pre- and post-launch analysis products are produced at the Cape Central Computer 
Complex. For over 20 years, the Eastern Range has depended on Cyber 860 mainframe 
computers at the Central Computer Complex to produce launch critical and instrumentation 
analysis and Range Safety flight analysis. These computers and the code that resides in them 
are outdated in that the hardware is very costly to maintain and software problems are too 
difficult to fix. Two projects are in progress to replace the 860 Cyber mainframe computers. 
Launch Analysis Production System. The launch analysis production system project is slated 
to replace Cyber 860 instrumentation analysis. The project is translating instrumentation 
analysis computer programs originally written in CDC Cyber FORTRAN to C++ programs that 
can be hosted on a standard personal computer. The project started in April 2005 and is 
scheduled to have the instrumentation analysis programs functioning by mid-2008. Most of the 
launch area production system hardware has been installed. Combined developmental and 
operational testing is underway. 
Safety Hazards Analysis and Risk Processing. The safety hazards analysis and risk 
processing project is slated to replace Cyber 860 flight analysis automation. The project is re-
hosting the CDC Cyber FORTRAN flight analysis programs primarily using MATLAB and C++ 
for computations and Java for the graphical user interface. This system will have open system 
architecture to allow incorporation of innovations in processor speed and storage capacity 
without major redevelopment. New commercial off-the-shelf software can be incorporated as 
"add-on" tools. The architecture will also accommodate the latest built-in analytical tools. 
Safety hazards analysis and risk processing is a two-phased project. Phase 1 provides the host 
computer, backup storage, version control tools, and in initial suite of flight analysis modules. 
These Phase 1 products will eliminate 45th Space Wing reliance on the Cyber mainframes to 
produce flight analysis launch support products. Phase I software modules will enable flight 
analysts to process range user and weather data to produce range safety display backgrounds 
and range safety risk-based products for launch day support. Phase 1 development was 
completed on schedule in October 2007. 
Phase 2 is underway and will provide contractor support for operational acceptance of Phase I, 
flight analysis enhancements that were not previously possible due to Cyber 860 limitations and 
documentation for an organic software maintenance capability. Operational acceptance is 
scheduled for March 2008. Phase 2 will continue until the end of 2008.
Page 5 of 5
NASA Range Safety Program
2007 Annual Report 
Space-Based Range 
Space-based range, formerly called space-based range demonstration and certification and 
space-based telemetry and range safety, is a multicenter NASA proof-of-concept project to 
determine if space-based communications can support the Range Safety functions (tracking 
data and flight termination signals) while also providing broadband Range User data (voice, 
video, and vehicle/payload data). 
Space-based range is made up of the Range Safety and the Range User systems. The Range 
Safety system sends tracking data from the vehicle to the ground and receives flight termination 
commands from the ground. The Range User system sends high-data-rate vehicle telemetry 
from the vehicle to the ground. Both systems use NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 
System (TDRSS). 
F15 Flights 
Between November 2006 and February 
2007, there were 11 space-based range 
flights on an F15-B at Dryden Flight 
Research Center. The primary goal for 
the Range User system was to test a 
184-element TDRSS Ku-band (15 
gigahertz) phased-array antenna with 
data rates of 5 and 10 megabits per 
second. The figure to the right shows 
the Range User antenna mounted 
behind the cockpit of an Fl 5. The 
Range Safety system tested its ability to 
maintain lock with two TDRSS satellites 
simultaneously on a highly dynamic 
aircraft simulating an out-of-control 
launch vehicle and to transition between 
receiving forward commands from the 
launch head and TDRSS. 
Because the Range Safety system used four S-band telemetry antennas (two forward and two 
return, with one set of each on the top and bottom of the aircraft), the antenna patterns were 
measured while they were mounted on the aircraft at the Benefield Anechoic Facility at Dryden 
Flight Research Facility. 
The Range User antenna was electronically steerable in elevation and mechanically steerable in 
azimuth. The antenna was 29.5 inches in diameter, 13 inches deep, and weighed 119 pounds. 
Custom algorithms used the vehicle position and attitude to steer the antenna towards TDRSS. 
All the Range User flights used TDW (one of the TDRSS satellites) at 1740 W longitude. 
Data Results 
The data was a combination of digitized, compressed black and white cockpit video, Range 
Safety tracking and transceiver data, and aircraft and antenna controller pulse-code modulated 
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data streams; internal protocol data formatting was used. The antenna controller data stream 
was sampled at 1 hertz to correlate with the uncorrected error rates measured by the White 
Sands TDRSS ground station. 
The figure below shows the link margins as a function of antenna elevation for a 5 and 10 
megabits per second flight. It was not possible to measure link margins greater than 9 decibels, 
so it can only be said that the link margins were greater than 9 decibels for elevations above 30 
degrees.
Link Margin vs. Antenna Elevation 
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Note: No coverage was guaranteed by the manufacturer below 300 elevation. 
The following table summarizes the percentage of locked frames for the Range User flights. The 
pointing error was typically much less than 1 degree. The measured data and video latency was 
about 0.4 seconds.
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Flight % Locked at WSC Notes 
1 99.91% 5 megabits per second 
2 88.16% 5 megabits per second, TDRSS Autotrack Problem 
3 99.95% 5 megabits per second 
4 98.16% 5 megabits per second, Intentionally exceeded antenna 
azimuth performance 
5 99.78% 5 megabits per second 
6 99.33% 10 megabits per second 
7 99.89% 10 megabits per second
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The Range Safety system used the previously flown S-band transceiver to validate the 840 bits 
per second forward link and the 10 kilobits per second return link. Several "fly-away" maneuvers 
were done to test the transition from launch head to satellite for the forward links and showed 
that there was a reasonably smooth transition between the launch head and TDRSS within 10 
to 20 kilometers of the launch head for a launch head power level of -84 dBm. The CA (coarse 
acquisition) code Global Positioning System receiver performed well and had very few dropouts, 
even during highly dynamic maneuvers.
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The objective of the Enhanced Flight Termination System Program is to develop the next 
generation flight termination system for the Department of Defense and NASA ranges. The 
program addresses robust command links for flight termination, including message formats, 
modulation methods, and encryption. 
Previous Status 
The Range Safety Group of the Range Commanders Council initiated a study task and 
ultimately selected the following: 
• Continuous phase frequency shift keying as the modulation scheme 
• A 64-bit triple data encryption standard for security 
• The layout of the 64-bit message for the new system. 
The Air Force Flight Test Center then let a contract to build prototype enhanced flight 
termination receiver decoders and an encoder for the ground transmitter. The receiver decoder 
and encoder units successfully demonstrated that the enhanced flight termination system would 
function in flight and in an operational setting. 
The Central Test and Evaluation Investment Program is funding the development of the flight 
termination receiver decoders, encoders, monitors, and encryption units for different range 
applications, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, space launch vehicles, and missiles. In August 
2004, two contracts to develop the enhanced flight termination receiver decoder engineering 
development units were awarded to L-3 Cincinnati Electronics and Herley Industries. In August 
2005, a contract to develop the ground systems (enhanced flight termination system encoder, 
monitor, and encryption unit) was awarded to L-3 Cincinnati Electronics. 
Current Accomplishments 
Milestones accomplished this year are described below. 
In early 2007, Qualification Testing was completed on three L-3 Cincinnati Electronics 
receivers. 
In October 2007, the entire system (ground equipment and receivers) was tested at Eglin 
Air Force Base onboard an Advanced Mid-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). The system 
performed nominally and marked the first live test of the entire system. 
Future Plans 
The Enhanced Flight Termination System Program will continue to work with various entities to 
achieve the goals of certifying this system. The program also desires to attempt more testing of 
the system in 2008 at various ranges.
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Enhanced Flight Termination System Architecture 
The enhanced flight termination system architecture consists of the vehicle and ground systems 
shown in the diagram below. The enhanced flight termination system was designed so that 
upon the completion and qualification of all units for both airborne and ground systems, 
implementation with existing architecture would minimally impact the ranges. 
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On the airborne side, the enhanced flight termination system uses existing components and 
systems, where the only new addition would be the new enhanced flight termination system 
command receiver/decoder. Legacy antennas, couplers, logic units, safety devices, and 
ordnance will be used along with the new command receiver/decoders and ground equipment. 
The ground systems architecture will change somewhat, but the impacts will not be severe. 
Ranges will have to purchase the new enhanced flight termination system ground equipment 
(encoders, monitors, and triple data encryption units) and each range can develop the 
unencrypted 64-bit enhanced flight termination system command frame (command controller) 
based on its own culture.
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The ground system will also implement existing technology and equipment including Range 
Safety Officer command panels, modulators/exciters, high power amplifiers, and command 
transmitters.
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Enhanced Flight Termination System Equipment 
Four of the major components of the enhanced flight termination system—enhanced flight 
termination receiver, triple data encryption unit, encoder, and monitor—are described below. 
Enhanced Flight Termination Receiver 
The receiver takes the encrypted messages sent from the 
command transmitter system (modulator, exciter, power 
amplifier) and decrypts them into useable commands. 
Triple Data Encryption Unit 
The triple data encryption unit is embedded within 
the encoders and encrypts the messages using the 
Triple Data Encryption Standard. A triple data 
encryption unit is embedded within each monitor for 
decryption of the enhanced flight termination system 
message for analysis.
The encoder takes the encrypted message from the triple data 
encryption unit and adds a certain amount of frame 
synchronization and parity bits for forward error correction before 
sending the final message to the Legacy exciters. 
Im 
Monitor 
The monitor is used as an analysis tool for Range Safety 
by providing an independent verification process for the 
transmitted enhanced flight termination system signal. 
The command transmitter system sends the final, 
encrypted enhanced flight termination system message to 
the receiver and to the monitor. 
After 2007, the Enhanced Flight Termination System Program is one step closer to bringing a 
new, qualified, improved system to ranges and range users. Milestones still remain as the 
program continues to get closer to bringing a new system currently under development into 
operational status. NASA Range Safety will continue to work with the enhanced flight 
termination system program and support the mission of providing a new advanced method of 
flight termination that will be low cost and low impact to ranges and range users, while providing 
a reliable system that will help ensure public safety during launch operations.
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To attract and win new commercial business, improve timeliness, and optimize the cost of doing 
business, Space Florida initiated the Customer Assistance Service Program for the Eastern 
Range and identified two experienced, highly regarded contractors to implement their program. 
The Customer Assistance Program has three phases: 
• Phase I - Analysis and Design: "Initial" Universal Document System and Range Safety 
Mentoring Capability/Services for customers; training plan development and course planning; 
and conceptual studies for a universal flight safety system. This Phase was completed in 2007 
• Phase II - Develop, Test, and Deliver: 'Mature" Universal Document System and Range 
Safety Mentoring Capability/Services for customers; training course development; and 
feasibility study for selected universal flight safety system concepts. This phase is currently in 
progress. 
• Phase Ill - Maintain and sustain customer services with continuous process improvement; 
complete testing, and obtain 45th Space Wing, Range Safety approval of the selected 
universal flight safety system. 
Mentoring 
Mentoring includes instruction and training and professional consultant services. Current 
customers include SpaceX and Orbital Sciences, with several more candidates coming on board 
in the near future. Services have included: 
Assistance with Universal Document System documentation 
• Flight safety system review and advice 
• AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements 
• Tailoring assistance 
• Compilation of new customer lessons learned 
• Liaison with the 45th Space Wing
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Training 
In Phase II, the final training plan is complete and the following courses, originally developed by 
NASA Range Safety, will be tailored for commercial customers: 
• Range Safety Overview 
• Range Flight Safety Analysis 
• Range Flight Safety Systems 
In addition, one new course, AFSPCMAN 91-710 Requirements, is under development. This 
course contains 10 stand-alone modules that cover the full spectrum of AFSPCMAN 91-710 
requirements. Module 1 is an overview of the entire document, and modules 2 through 10 are 
in-depth reviews of the nine major sections of 91-710. All modules are designed for both 
engineering and non-engineering staff of commercial customers. 
Universal Flight Safety System 
The third component of Customer Assistance Service Program for the Eastern Range is the 
development of the universal flight safety system. This development will pay big dividends for the 
State of Florida by providing an incentive for commercial customers to come to the Eastern 
Range. The plan is to develop the universal flight safety system, either at the component level or 
system level, obtain pre-approval of the components and/or system by 45th Space Wing, Range 
Safety, and make it available to commercial customers, saving them much of the cost and time for 
flight safety system development and testing. 
The Space Florida contractor will collect and document available universal flight safety system 
component information to fully populate the "Flight Termination System Component Matrix" 
developed in Phase I. The information will be divided and color-coded into categories and will 
contain enough information for customers to select current and future flight termination system 
components for a variety of launch vehicles. 
The contractor will develop a Universal Flight Safety System Concept Feasibility Report 
recommending one short-term concept and one long-term concept for implementation. They will 
then prepare a Universal Flight Safety System Concept Implementation Plan for Phase III. This 
plan will include a detailed concept of operations and schedule. Current NASA systems under 
development, such as the enhanced flight safety system and the autonomous flight safety 
system, are included in the trade studies. 
In Phase Ill, the contractor will update the universal flight safety system schedule and concept 
of operations; provide the required technical expertise during each phase of the flight safety 
system selection process to include support to identify flight safety system selection
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components, review proposed test plans, and monitor and review qualification and acceptance 
testing for each flight safety system selection component. The contractor will continue to work 
with Space Florida and its designated customers to receive final certification and approval from 
the Eastern Range to use each flight safety system selection component and/or integrated 
system. 
The comprehensive training, professional consultations, and universal flight safety system 
options will greatly ease a new customer's transition onto the Eastern Range and significantly 
reduce the current time schedules for launch requirements.
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Payload Safety Program 
NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance designated a NASA Expendable 
Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Manager and an Agency Team to establish the NASA 
Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Program and develop policy and requirements in 
support of this safety program. Program policy was placed in the last version of NPR 8715.3, 
NASA General Safety Program Requirements, paragraph 3.13.4.5. 
The team's goal is to develop a program with improved structure and processes for ensuring 
NASA expendable launch vehicle payloads are consistently designed, transported, processed, 
tested, integrated with the launch vehicle, and launched safely. The Agency Team is updating 
the expendable launch vehicle payload safety review process and replacing the current NASA-
STD-8719.8, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Review Process Standard, with the 
two following documents: 
NASA procedural requirements document, NPR 871 5.XX Expendable Launch Vehicle 
Payload Safety Program 
NASA Standard, NASA-STD-8715.18, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Design 
and Ground Operations Requirements 
The new process and requirements will be coordinated and implemented jointly with the Air 
Force approval process (for launches from Air Force ranges) and will retain the Payload Safety 
Working Group and a phased safety review approach. 
The new NPR 871 5.)(X, Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Program draft has been 
reviewed and commented on by each NASA Center Safety and Mission Assurance Director. 
The NPR has been improved and finalized based on comments from the review and will be 
submitted in the formal approval process in January of 2008. 
The current Draft NASA STD-8719.8 Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Design and 
Ground Operations Requirements contains NASA's requirements for safeguarding people and 
resources (including flight hardware and facilities) from hazards associated with payloads that 
will fly on expendable launch vehicles, including hazards associated with payload related 
ground support equipment. 
This standard infuses and tailors applicable NASA, industry, and Air Force Range Safety 
requirements into a single standard for NASA expendable launch vehicle payload projects. This 
methodology was used to ensure a single baseline requirements document that the Payload 
Project Office will tailor for both Air Force and NASA acceptance and approval. This NASA 
Standard should be completed by the summer of 2008 and programmatic activities continue. 
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Educational Balloon Release Program 
The Space Academy, a joint venture between 
Space Florida and the NASA/Florida Space Grant 
Consortium, was specially designed to encourage 
students to continue their studies in science-based 
programs at their college or university, through 
continuing studies, Kennedy Space Center 
Internships, and science-based research 
programs. The Academy hosts Florida teachers, 
undergraduates, middle school, and high school 
students in a range of scientific and hands-on 
activities at the Kennedy Space Center Visitors 
Complex Education Center. The students and 
teachers represent several academic institutions 
from across the state of Florida and the nation. 
The program focuses on bridging engineering and science gaps that currently exist in 
academics and in the workforce. In addition to the hands-on activities, the students work 
on a number of interdisciplinary projects designed to help them become problem-
solvers, with real-life space and science-based problems. The students also have the 
opportunity to meet with top NASA scientists as well as potential Kennedy Space Center 
employers. 
Educational Balloon Release Program 
Over the past two years, 22 balloons have been released: 10 in 2006 and 12 in 2007. 
The releases have taken place from a variety of locations ranging from the Cape 
Canaveral Air Force Station Weather Station, the Kennedy Space Center Visitors 
Complex, Kelly Park on Merritt Island, and the Astronaut Hall of Fame in Titusville. 
CLA
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These scientific balloons are designed to climb to an altitude of over 100,000 feet (20 
miles), and at that altitude, relay pictures of the curvature of the Earth and the blackness 
of space back to the students. 
The scientific balloons are launched 
from Kennedy Space Center with the 
following payloads on board: 
• Live camera that is set to relay 
pictures to a ground receiver and 
monitor 
• Global Positioning System designed to 
chart the flight pattern of the balloon 
Plans are in the works for additional payloads such as ozone monitoring sensors. 
Balloon Release Program Safety Requirements 
NASA Range Safety works with the 45th Space Wing Safety Office to ensure all requirements 
and common sense practices are satisfied. In the balloon release program, Space Florida must 
adhere to four primary requirements. 
1. Any individual payload package weighing over 4 pounds must have a surface density of less 
than 3 ounces per square inch (computed by dividing the total weight by the area of the 
smallest surface of the package). 
2. Any individual payload package must weigh less than 6 pounds. 
3. The total payload must weigh less than 12 pounds (Space Florida payloads generally weigh 
less than 14 ounces). 
4. The payload suspension line must have a breaking strength of not more than 50 pounds. 
These are the same requirements used for the daily weather balloon releases by the 45 Space 
Wing at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station Weather Facility. Balloons flown under these 
requirements are exempt from notification to Federal Aviation Administration control facilities, 
but Space Florida makes pre-launch courtesy notifications to the Kennedy Space Center Shuttle 
Landing Facility/Military Radar Unit and to the 45th Space Wing, 1st Range Operations Squadron 
since the release location is inside restricted airspace under their control. 
Once all of these requirements and notifications have been satisfied, the 45th Space Wing 
Safety Office issues an approval letter with concurrence from NASA Range Safety to Space 
Florida to conduct their balloon release.
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The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative is tasked with implementing NASA 
policy and keeping NASA's Range Safety Manager informed of all activities related to range 
safety. Over the course of the past year, the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety 
Representative supported a multitude of range safety activities, ranging from pre-launch policy 
interpretation and guidance to provision of on-console support during launch campaigns. 
Constellation Program 
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative participated in multiple meetings and 
technical exchange sessions in support of developing a draft set of tailored range safety 
requirements for the ARIES 1-X test flight mission. 
The mission has to meet both AFSPCMAN 91-710; Range Safety User Requirements, and NPR 
8715.5; Range Safety Program requirements. The 45th Space Wing Safety Office, the 
Constellation Program Office, and NASA Range Safety worked through the Launch 
Constellation Range Safety Panel to successfully develop a single tailored document that 
includes all range safety requirements. The teaming process hopefully sets the groundwork for 
future Constellation Program range safety requirements document tailoring. The effort also 
exemplified NASA's philosophy of accepting or sharing responsibility for all aspects of range 
safety. 
The Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative led an effort to prepare a 
requirements document that will be used to develop a Constellation Program Range Safety Risk 
Analysis Tool Kit. In 2007, a team consisting of NASA Range Safety, 45th Space Wing Safety 
Office, and risk model development support contractors completed a requirements document 
that will pave the way for future risk model development. The document includes preferred 
modeling capabilities, but also focuses on verification and validation and configuration 
management requirements. Although the ascent debris hazard assessment capability will be 
developed first, other hazards such as descent debris, distant focusing overpressure, and toxics 
risk are also being considered. Actual model development will begin early next year. 
The Range Safety Representative also provided continued support to the Launch Constellation 
Range Safety Panel.
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Space Shuttle Program 
For the Space Shuttle program, the Kennedy Space 
Center Range Safety Representative was involved in the 
development of an update to the Launch Commit Criteria 
Document which will implement NPR 8715.5 
requirements. Following discussions with the Launch 
Commit Criteria Working Group, a decision was made 
late in the year to develop a separate section that 
contains all Shuttle-specific NASA range fetv 
commit criteria. Work will continue in 200 
Launch and entry risk estimates were evauatea ior D i 
117, STS-1 18 and STS-120, with mitigation efforts 
initiated through the Kennedy Space Center Emergency 
Operations Center when appropriate. 
Mitigation efforts were required to minimize the distant focusing overpressure risk for all three 
missions while STS 120 also required mitigation efforts to reduce debris risk. Efforts included 
moving personnel from windows to mitigate distant focusing overpressure risk and moving 
people outside of facilities to mitigate risk from debris. 
The Range Safety Representative also provided continued support to the Shuttle Range Safety 
Panel and supported STS-117, STS-118, and STS-120 launches on console in the Morrell 
Operations Control Center. 
Launch Services Program 
For the launch services program, the Range 
Safety Representative supported a number of 
NASA expendable launch vehicle campaigns, 
including Dawn, Phoenix, AIM, and THEMIS. 
This effort involved attending all the NASA and 
Air Force Safety readiness reviews and ensuring 
NASA procedural requirements were being met 
during the respective launch countdowns. An 
artist's concept of the five THEM IS satellites 
being released from their carrier is shown at 
right.
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Agency Activities 
For Agency activities, the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative served as a 
NASA point of contact to the Range Safety Group and supported several committees charged 
with developing or rewriting nationwide standards on a number of important range safety issues. 
These topics included developing reusable launch vehicle and unmanned aerial vehicle 
requirements and a rewrite of RCC 321, Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges for risk 
evaluation and approval. 
Other Range Safety Activities 
Other Range Safety activities that the KSC Range Safety Representative was involved in 
included the following: 
•	 Documenting approval of range safety non-conformances/variances for all applicable NASA 
launches 
•	 Supporting discussions regarding flight termination system frequency migration plans and 
how they affect future NASA missions 
•	 Supporting discussions relative to meeting secure systems requirements found in NPR 
2810, Security of Information Technology 
• Assisting the Agency Range Safety Manager in developing a Range Safety Operations 
course for NASA, the last in a series of NASA Safety Training Center taught courses 
•	 Developing, tracking, and implementing corrective actions from items identified during the 
Kennedy Space Center Infrastructure, Facilities, and Operations Audit performed by NASA 
Headquarters 
•	 Providing toxic and distant focus overpressure risk analysis support to Wallops Flight 
Facility for the TAC SAT-2 Minotaur launch 
The past year was a challenge in supporting a number of launch and entry campaigns, 
providing critical early support to the Constellation Program, and continuing to ensure Kennedy 
Space Center safely implements NASA Range Safety requirements. The coming year promises 
to be at least as busy and the Kennedy Space Center Range Safety Representative will 
continue to provide critical support whenever called upon by NASA programs or to address 
issues that may arise.
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Wallops Flight Facility had a particularly active and 
successful year in 2007. The Sounding Rocket 
Program conducted 17 missions, highlighted by field 
campaigns conducted in Poker Flat, Alaska and 
Norway, along with additional missions launched from 
Wallops and White Sands Missile Range. The figure 
at right shows a Poker Flat launch for observations of 
a pulsating aurora. See the table at the end of this 
article for details of the 2007 launches. 
In addition to its operational missions, the Sounding 
Rocket Program conducted efforts to bring the Patriot 
and Multi-Launch Rocket System motors into the 
program as new low-cost configurations to support 
science and technology missions. 
Balloon Program Office 
The Balloon Program Office at Wallops Flight Facility conducted 18 missions during fiscal year 
2007. Flight operations were conducted from Fort Sumner, New Mexico; Palestine, Texas; 
Kiruna, Sweden; and McMurdo, Antarctica. The Wallops Safety Office supported the 2007 
Balloon flight program by providing flight safety risk analysis reports for operational 
implementation for both continental United States and foreign operations in support of Space 
and Earth science payloads as well as developmental test flights for new balloon design and 
balloon film qualification. 
Flight durations ranged from 6 hours to 35 and 1/2 days with the longest flight occurring over 
Antarctica. The Balloon Program Office continued the ultra long duration balloon vehicle 
development. Flight testing of the ultra long duration balloon is planned for 2008. The balloon is 
being developed to provide extended duration flight, upwards of 60-100 days, at constant float 
altitudes. 
See the results of the Balloon Program Missions 2007 in the table at the end of this document. 
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Other Missions 
Wallops Flight Facility was involved in a number of other programs, including measuring the 
changes in the Greenland ice cap, unmanned aerial vehicle demonstrations, hurricane 
research, and the launch of the Missile Defense Agency near field infrared satellite. 
Measuring Changes in the Greenland Ice Cap 
The Airborne Science Program conducted a series of missions using the Wallops Orion P-313 
aircraft, including an annual campaign to measure changes in the Greenland ice cap. 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Activities 
Wallops also supported numerous unmanned aerial vehicle activities. Wallops worked with 
Aurora Flight Sciences to flight demonstrate a new ducted fan unmanned aerial vehicle, the GE-
80, as a test platform to demonstrate advances in platform-independent science and data 
systems. These systems are intended to standardize systems used for science applications and 
streamline integration processes. 
Hurricane Research
-	 -	 -	
V 
Aerosonde flew in the eye wall of  
Hurricane Noel for 7 and Y2 hours in  
winds reaching 80 mph at altitudes 
ranging from 300 to 2000 feet and  
provided real-time detailed 
observations of the near surface, 
high wind environment. 
The Aerosonde mission into Hurricane Noel was the first ever 
successful flight of an unmanned aircraft into the inner core of 
a hurricane. 
Near Field Infrared Experiment Satellite Launch 
In addition to internal NASA sounding rocket and unmanned 
aerial vehicle missions, the Research Range conducted 
numerous missions for non-NASA organizations. The 
Range launched the near field infrared experiment satellite 
for the Missile Defense Agency on a Minotaur I rocket. It was 
the second Minotaur mission conducted by Wallops. 
Wallops continued its hurricane 
research collaboration with the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration using the 
AAI/Aerosonde unmanned aerial 
vehicle shown at right.
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New Range Technologies 
Wallops continued development of a number of key technologies intended to improve mission 
capabilities and lower costs. 
Low-Cost TDRSS Transceiver 
The Wallops Flight Facility-developed low-cost TDRSS transceiver (LCT2) successfully added the 
receive capabilities to the existing transmitter capabilities. Flight tests will continue in 2008 to 
demonstrate the full functionality of this dramatically lower-cost system. 
Autonomous Flight Safety System 
The autonomous flight safety system was successfully demonstrated as a payload on the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency-sponsored SpaceX Falcon 1 mission conducted from 
Kwajalein Atoll. Once fully developed and tested, this system offers the opportunity for reduced 
ground instrumentation by using onboard sensors and preprogrammed safety rules to determine 
the need for flight termination. 
Phased Array Antenna 
Work also began on a new phased array antenna design that offers opportunity for significantly 
higher data rates on suborbital and orbital launch vehicles. 
Ku Band Telemetry System 
Wallops is also actively developing a high data rate (-200megabytes) Ku Band telemetry system, in 
an effort sponsored by the Missile Defense Agency. The system will be demonstrated on a 
sounding rocket mission in mid-2008. 
Wallops Safety Office Support 
The Wallops Safety Office supported each of these missions through pre-mission analysis and 
certification, as well as providing operational personnel during launch operations. The Safety 
Office also contributed significantly to the technology efforts through providing engineering and 
safety expertise into designs that will enable these tools to meet range safety requirements for 
flight. The Safety Office also is actively engaged with other NASA and external organizations in 
the assessment and improvement of analysis tools that allow for streamlined and consistent 
implementation of safety analysis techniques for mission planning.
Page 3 of 3
NASA Range Safety Program
2007 Annual Report 
Dryden Flight Research Center 
The Dryden Flight Research Center, located at Edwards Air Force Base, California, is NASA's 
primary installation for flight research. Over the past 60 years, projects at Dryden have led to 
major advancements in the design and capabilities of many civilian and military aircraft. The 
Center is involved in the following: 
•	 Support of operations for the Space Shuttle 
•	 Development of future access-to-space vehicles 
•	 Conduct of airborne science missions and flight operations 
• Development of piloted and unmanned aircraft test beds for research and science missions 
Range Safety operations at Dryden are managed by the Range Safety Office. Under an alliance 
agreement with the Air Force Flight Test Center, the Dryden Center Director established the 
Range Safety Office to provide independent review and oversight of range safety issues. The 
Range Safety Office also supports the Center by providing trained flight termination system 
engineers, Range Safety Risk Analysts, and Range Safety Officers to provide mission and 
project support. In addition, the office supports the NASA Range Safety Training Program by 
providing the unmanned aerial system perspective in the development of range safety courses. 
Unmanned Aerial Systems and Vehicles 
Dryden continues to support the testing of a wide range of unmanned aerial systems and 
vehicles. The systems and vehicles flown with Dryden's assistance are described below. 
Model-Type Unmanned Aerial Systems 
The model-type unmanned aerial systems consist of tactical reconnaissance and surveillance 
vehicles. The primary purpose of the flights was to acceptance test the vehicles before delivery 
to the United States military. Dryden has supported over 340 hours of operations on six vehicles 
from three different companies. 
Blended Wing Body Low Speed Vehicle 
The blended wing body low speed vehicle unmanned aerial vehicle is a dynamically scaled 
version of the original concept vehicle. The primary goals of the test and research project for 
this vehicle are as follows: 
• Study the flight and handling characteristics of the blended wind body design 
• Match vehicle performance with engineering predictions based on computer and wind tunnel 
studies 
• Develop and evaluate digital flight control algorithms 
• Assess the integration of the propulsion system to the airframe 
Industry studies suggest that because of its efficient configuration, the blended wing body would 
consume 20 percent less fuel than jetliners of today, while cruising at high subsonic speeds on 
flights of up to 7,000 nautical miles. To date, the project has conducted six successful flights. 
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lkhana 
NASA's lkhana unmanned aerial vehicle is 
a General Atomics Predator-B modified to 
support the conduct of Earth science 
missions for the Science Mission 
Directorate. The aircraft is capable of 
mission durations in excess of 24 hours at 
altitudes above 40,000 feet. On-board 
support systems include a NASA 
developed airborne research test system. 
The test system can host research flight 
control algorithms that can test 
autonomous sensor or autonomous 
aircraft control concepts. The aircraft is 
designed to be disassembled and 
transported in a large shipping container 
aboard standard military transports. 
The vehicle has successfully flown multiple missions over the western United States in support 
of the National Interagency Fire Center. The flights reached as far north as Washington, Idaho, 
and Montana. Recently, the vehicle has flown multiple missions successfully over the Southern 
California wildfires, sending near real-time imagery to the firefighters. 
The Range Safety Office has supported flight planning and risk analysis tasks in support of 
Federal Aviation Administration Certificate of Authorization applications as well as real-time 
operations support. The vehicle has flown seventeen flights this year with durations lasting as 
long as 14 hours. 
Orion 
The Orion Project is part of NASA's 
Constellation Program. The Orion Project 
consists of the crew module (shown right) and 
launch abort system. 
Dryden is tasked with conducting a series of 
flight tests to demonstrate proper operations of 
the launch abort system and the crew module 
recovery systems in response to abort events 
initiated on the launch pad and during the initial 
ascent phase of flight. 
The abort flight tests will be conducted at the 
White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
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NASA Headquarters 
The Safety and Assurance Requirements Division at the Headquarters Office of Safety 
and Mission Assurance provides corporate leadership in the definition and 
implementation of NASA's agency-wide Safety and Mission Assurance policies, 
procedures, standards, tools, techniques, and training, including the Agency Range 
Safety and Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Programs. 
The Headquarters Range Safety Representative and other members of the Office of 
Safety and Mission Assurance participated in two primary activities in 2007 in support of 
the Range Safety Program: 
• An independent audit of the agency and local Range Safety functions at Kennedy 
Space Center 
• A review and update of NPR 8715.5, NASA Range Safety Program 
The audit went very well with only a few minor findings that are currently being 
corrected. 
A Range Safety Team meeting—including members from Headquarters Office of Safety 
and Mission Assurance, Kennedy Space Center, Dryden Flight Research Center, 
Wallops Flight Facility, and Air Force Space Command—was held in Colorado Springs 
to kick off the 8515.5 update. Action items from this meeting are being worked before the 
NPR is submitted for formal review in 2008. 
Other activities included support to the following: 
• Expendable Launch Vehicle Payload Safety Program 
• Range Commanders Council Range Safety Group 
• Space Shuttle and Constellation Range Safety Panels 
• Training development, including a critique of the Range Safety Operations pilot 
course 
• Support to research and development projects such as the joint advanced range 
safety system, autonomous flight safety system, and enhanced flight termination 
system 
This annual report contains articles about each of the activities listed above.
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Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel 
In February 2006, the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel was 
y	
officially chartered by the Constellation Program and jointly signed by the 
45th Space Wing Commander and the program manager. This article 
addresses the development and implementation of two working groups; 
CONSTELLATION Ares l-X tailoring, linear-shaped charge extension, and flight termination 
system command frequency modifications; and the Orion abort flight test 
campaign. 
Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel Trajectory Working Group 
The Trajectory Working Group was the first sub-group to be chartered by the Launch 
Constellation Range Safety Panel. The primary responsibility of this group is to ensure that each 
of the range safety trajectory analysis requirements, as specified by the 45th Space Wing, is 
coordinated among the proper NASA centers. 
Consequently, the working group is responsible for 
technical management of diverse trajectory modeling and 
simulation tasks and related analysis efforts, as well as for 
technical oversight of the product review and approval 
process preceding official delivery of trajectory datasets 
and vehicle debris catalogs to the 45th Space Wing. 
Trajectory Working Group activities were primarily focused 
on satisfying range safety requirements for a planned 
launch of the Ares l-X flight test vehicle in April 2009. As a 
result of these activities, the following official products 
were successfully completed and delivered to the 45th 
Space Wing in 2007: 
Ares l-X Preliminary Nominal and Malfunction Turn Trajectories. This dataset included 
thousands of trajectories for various failure scenarios. The task to generate these 
trajectories also involved extensive simulation development that was performed to model 
many different vehicle failure modes. 
Ares l-X Preliminary Debris Catalog. This dataset included mass property, dimension, and 
ballistic coefficient estimates for various debris pieces and vehicle segments that may pose 
a potential hazard in the event of vehicle breakup. To complete this task, an assessment of 
the vehicle breakup sequence was performed as well as an aerodynamic analysis of the 
various debris pieces. 
In addition to the products delivered to the Eastern Range, the working group coordinated 
another analysis task in support of the Constellation Program's debate as to whether to extend 
the linear-shaped charge to cover the Ares l-X first stage aft segment. The working group 
participants conducted an extensive assessment of Ares l-X trajectories and debris fields that 
showed clear risk benefits were achievable when the first stage linear-shaped charge was 
extended.
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NASA centers providing integral support for these analysis tasks and Ares l-X range safety 
products included Langley Research Center, Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight 
Center, and Glenn Research Center. Representatives from Kennedy Space Center and the 45th 
Space Wing were also regular participants in working group activities throughout the year and 
provided invaluable advice and technical assistance on many occasions. 
Range safety trajectory related activities for the Ares l-X vehicle will carry through to 2008 in 
support of the final flight plan approval process. 
Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel Probabilistic Risk Assessment Working 
Group 
The Probabilistic Risk Assessment Working Group was first chartered in early 2007 as the 
forum through which all launch vehicle range safety related reliability analyses and products 
would be coordinated for the Constellation Program. This technical forum supports the Launch 
Constellation Range Safety Panel in all matters related to vehicle failure probability estimation 
for range safety risk assessments in compliance with the requirements of the Constellation 
Program, NASA's NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program, and applicable Air Force Range Safety 
policy and requirements. The members of the working group include representatives from the 
Launch Vehicle Project Office (Ares, Ares I-X), Mission Operations, Safety and Mission 
Assurance, and the 45th Space Wing. 
The working group completed a number of tasks in 2007 in support of the Ares l-X flight test 
vehicle. In particular, the group coordinated all tasks pertaining to a preliminary Ares l-X range 
safety probabilistic risk assessment that was provided to the United States Air Force as part of 
the Ares l-X preliminary flight data plan. The Ares I-X preliminary probabilistic risk assessment 
was developed by Safety and Mission Assurance personnel at Johnson Space Center, Marshall 
Space Flight Center, and Langley Research Center. 
The results of the probabilistic risk assessment serve as a potential input to future Ares l-X 
launch area risk assessments. In addition to the probabilistic risk assessment development, the 
working group also coordinated discussions between NASA and Air Force personnel regarding 
the selection of assumptions and datasets for use in the Ares l-X risk assessments. The group 
will continue to coordinate the Ares l-X probabilistic risk assessment-related work in 2008 in 
support of the Range Safety final flight data plan approval process. 
Other Topics Considered by the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel 
Many other topics were addressed past year, including Ares I-X tailoring, linear-shaped charge 
extension, flight termination system command frequency modifications, and the Orion abort 
flight test campaign.
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Ares l-X Requirements Tailoring 
Ares l-X and the 45th Space Wing conducted numerous Technical Interface Meetings during the 
past year to produce an AFSPCMAN 91-710, Range Safety User Requirements, tailored 
document for the Ares l-X flight test vehicle. During those iterations, the document underwent a 
metamorphosis in which it finally became the repository of all range safety user requirements for 
both the Air Force and NASA. Despite many difficult challenges, the High Performance Work 
Team consisting of representatives from the 45th Space Wing Safety Office, NASA Range 
Safety, the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel, and the Ares l-X Flight Test Vehicle 
Mission produced a revolutionary document that incorporates requirements from both 
AFSPCMAN 91-710 and NPR 8715.5. The document is currently in the approval process. 
Ares I-X Linear-Shaped Charge Extension 
As a carry-over task from 2006, the safety community, including both NASA and Air Force 
Range Safety, engaged the Constellation Program in an attempt to have the Ares l-X Flight Test 
Vehicle Mission extend the linear-shaped charge currently installed in the Shuttle heritage solid 
rocket booster so that it would cover the booster aft segment. Because of added budget and 
schedule risks, the Ares l-X Mission initially opposed the proposal. However, in January the 
Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel, with the support of the 45th Space Wing, successfully 
presented their position to the Constellation Program Manager. 
As a result, a Technical Interface Meeting was held at the ATK manufacturing facility in Utah. 
This meeting was supported by representatives from Ares I-X, the Launch Constellation Range 
Safety Panel, and the 45th Space Wing. During this meeting, a concerted effort was made to 
understand the cost and schedule impacts that would result from the extension. The preliminary 
position of the Ares I-X Mission at the onset of the meeting was that it would cause a delay of up 
to eight months and dramatically increase costs. 
During the weeklong meeting, these estimates were reviewed and, with the willingness of the 
45th Space Wing to compromise on a qualification program for the extension and some 
innovative scheduling, the final schedule showed the linear-shaped charge to be available 
earlier than the need date to support a 15 April 2009 launch with only moderate budget 
increases. 
Ares I-X Flight Termination System Command Frequency Modifications 
At the end of 2006, considerable effort went into determining whether the Ares l-X Flight Test 
Vehicle Mission would be required to migrate to a flight termination system command frequency 
of 421 megahertz or whether it could still use 416.5 megahertz as does the Shuttle. By the end 
of 2006, it was widely believed that a policy established by both NASA and the Air Force of 
staying on 416.5 megahertz would assure that the Ares I-X Mission would not have to migrate to 
the higher frequency.
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However, by the end of the first quarter of 2007, that assumption was less certain. As a result, in 
2007, the Air Force negotiated with the National Telecommunications and Information Agency to 
allow both commercial and NASA launches on the range to continue to use a flight termination 
system command frequency of 416.5 megahertz. As part of the agreement, the Air Force will 
seek a Special Temporary Authority for each launch through calendar year 2010. 
Orion Abort Flight Test Campaign at White Sands Missile Range 
Throughout 2007, Constellation's Orion Project worked with the 
White Sands Missile Range Flight Safety Office on the Orion Abort 
Flight Test campaign. 
Beginning in 2008, a series of launches will be conducted at White 
Sands to test the launch abort system of the Orion spacecraft 
(shown right). 
The launch abort system would be used operationally to pull the crew module away from the 
Ares I launch vehicle following a catastrophic failure of the Ares on the launch pad or during 
early ascent. Five tests are currently planned at White Sands. Two flights are pad abort tests 
and the remainder are classified as ascent abort tests where the abort is initiated at a specified 
test condition during the ascent of a test booster. 
An analysis showed that a flight termination system would not be required for the launch abort 
system. The White Sands Missile Range Flight Safety Office approved this analysis and 
established a four nautical mile exclusion zone for the pad abort tests. Submitted analysis also 
showed that Launch Complex 32 would be acceptable for both the pad abort and ascent abort 
missions. This common pad approach will result in considerable savings to the project. 
Lockheed-Martin, Northrop-Grumman, Orbital (Chandler), Langley Research Center 
Engineering, Johnson Space Center Engineering, and Johnson Space Center Mission 
Operations all contributed to these studies. Range approval allowed pad area construction to 
begin on 1 October 2007. 
The project completed the required tailoring of NPR 8715.5 in support of the Pad Abort-1 flight 
as well as the required risk management plan. The Range Commanders Council Standards that 
govern flight safety at White Sands Missile Range were reviewed by the project and no tailoring 
was identified for the pad abort missions. The program introduction document to White Sands 
Missile Range was completed and the operational requirements document is nearing 
completion. The Pad Abort -i Flight Safety Operations Plan will be released by the range in 
response to the operational requirements as the launch date for Pad Abort-1 approaches. 
White Sands Missile Range has supplied the required Pad Abort-1 range safety data products 
and delivery dates, and the project has started work in this area. White Sands generally prefers 
a failure modes and effects criticality analysis methodology for assessing the test vehicle 
reliability. The failure modes and effects criticality analysis product is generally used by other 
range customers and was specified in the range letter defining the products.
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NASA and Lockheed-Martin prefer a probabilistic reliability assessment approach since this 
methodology is used throughout the remainder of the Constellation Program. After a series of 
meetings on this topic, White Sands Missile Range agreed to the use of a probabilistic reliability 
assessment for the Pad Abort-1 reliability product. A failure modes and effects criticality analysis 
may still be required for the abort test booster, which will first be used for the ascent abort 1 
mission scheduled for the fall of 2009.
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During 2007, the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel 
dealt with a number of topics related to the Space 
Shuttle. Included were Shuttle main engine reliability 
assessment, advanced master events controller 
spurious output testing, and ceiling and visibility 
launch commit criteria. Also addressed were command 
receiver decoder implementation and public entry risk 
assessment flight rule updates. 
Space Shuttle Main Engine Reliability Assessments 
During the past several years, NASA and the 45th Space Wing have made significant progress 
on updating the launch area risk assessment input parameters that are used as part of the 
process of estimating public risk for each Shuttle launch. One of the input parameters pertains 
to vehicle failure probabilities and is addressed using the Shuttle probabilistic risk assessment 
data generated by NASA. The NASA probabilistic risk assessment data include both a failure 
probability estimate and a time distribution for each identified failure mode. The probability 
estimate and time distribution for Space Shuttle main engine related failures were reassessed in 
2007. Prior NASA studies indicated that a uniform distribution (i.e., constant failure probability 
as a function of time in flight) was the most appropriate distribution for main engine failures. 
The Space Shuttle main engine failure distribution was reanalyzed by both NASA and 45th 
Space Wing personnel, and the results were discussed at the Range Safety Panel in April 2007. 
The conclusion from that panel meeting was that the uniform distribution was the most 
representative distribution based on the current Space Shuttle main engine data and analyses 
compiled to date. As a result, the launch area risk assessment input parameters pertaining to 
failure time distributions remained unchanged. 
Advanced Master Events Controller Spurious Output Testing 
During advanced master events controller testing in the Shuttle Avionics Integration Lab, it was 
noted that advanced master events controller outputs would spuriously turn on when the 
controllers are powered down. This raised concern as to whether the spurious advanced master 
events controller commands could trigger the solid rocket booster range safety safe and arm 
device to the SAFE position and/or left or right solid rocket booster range safety Power Off 
(command receiver/decoder off). 
Research into the anomalous advanced master events controller condition and the interface 
circuit design led the Range to conclude that spurious output of the solid rocket booster range 
safety SAFE is acceptable for all vehicles/missions. Each advanced master events controller 
controls 1 of 2 switches in series between the command receiver decoder and the safe and arm 
device. The switches are non-latching and reset within 50 milliseconds (per command receiver 
decoder specification) after power is removed. The worst-case circuit analysis shows they 
actually reset within 8.7 milliseconds.
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To impact the safe and arm device, spurious output from both advanced master events 
controllers would need to occur within 8.7 milliseconds, which was considered non-credible. 
Additionally, the voltage/duration observed will not reset the switch. 
Research into the anomalous advanced master events controller condition and the interface 
circuit design led the Range to conclude that spurious output to the solid rocket booster range 
safety system safe and arm is acceptable for all vehicles/missions. The maximum spurious 
output voltage seen on the STS-123 installed advanced master events controllers was 13.3 Vdc 
for 300 microseconds. Worst-case circuit analysis showed that spurious master events 
controller inputs to the command receiver decoder of 32 Vdc for less than 2.6 milliseconds will 
not latch the command receiver decoder. 
Also, worst-case circuit analysis showed that spurious master events controller inputs to the 
command receiver decoder that are less than 14.4 Vdc (steady state) will not latch the 
command receiver decoder. So the maximum advanced master events controller voltage 
output/duration seen to date will not reset the command receiver decoders. Given this data and 
the understanding of the cause of the condition, the Range has accepted this condition "as is" 
for all flights provided that testing is done no earlier than 6 months before scheduled launch to 
ensure the anomalous condition does not degrade further. 
Ceiling and Visibility Launch Commit Criteria 
The Shuttle ceiling and visibility launch commit criteria was evaluated in an effort to understand 
how the criteria were established and whether they needed to be updated. The evaluation 
focused on part of the launch commit criteria that states that, for short duration launch windows, 
the cloud ceiling at the pad can be no less than 6,000 feet for a cloud deck greater than 500 feet 
thick. The Shuttle Range Safety Panel requested this evaluation to determine if the launch 
commit criteria could be lowered to 5,000 feet to be consistent with the "Return to Launch Site" 
launch commit criteria ceiling limit. 
The impact of lowering the ceiling launch commit criteria to 5,000 feet was measured by 
evaluating the casualty expectation (Es). The study showed that with a constant delay time 
between vehicle failure and vehicle breakup, the overall risk remained constant with ceiling 
altitude. However, as the delay time between vehicle failure and vehicle breakup increased, the 
risk increased. 
A delay time between 7 and 10 seconds resulted in acceptable E c values; however, a delay time 
of approximately 15 seconds and above caused Ec violations. Traditionally, 7 seconds is the 
accepted delay time used for analysis. In the event that the Mission Flight Control Officers may 
need to initiate the Range Safety System, the lack of visibility of the vehicle due to a cloud 
ceiling would lessen the visual cues for the Mission Flight Control Officer and likely increase the 
delay time.
Page 2 of 4
NASA Range Safety Program
2007 Annual Report 
Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel 
The Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel concluded that the cloud ceiling altitude did not 
significantly affect risk. Although lowering the launch commit criteria ceiling limit from 6,000 feet 
to 5,000 feet may yield acceptable risk values, the panel decided not to pursue the change at 
this time. 
Command Receiver Decoder Implementation 
The command receiver decoder replaced both the integrated receiver decoder and range safety 
distributor on the solid rocket booster range safety system and completed its first flight during 
the STS-1 18 mission in August 2007. The solid rocket booster range safety system, otherwise 
known as the airborne command destruct system, provides personnel and property protection in 
the event of flight path deviation or inadvertent vehicle breakup. The command receiver decoder 
was implemented due to supportability and obsolescence concerns for the integrated receiver 
decoder and range safety distributor previously used for all Shuttle missions. 
Two command receiver decoders (System A and B) are required per solid rocket booster (four 
per flight). Their functions include providing control of the safe and arm device (System A only) 
in response to Orbiter master events controller or solid rocket booster multiplexer/demultiplexer 
commands and commanding the safe and arm device to SAFE during flight operations shortly 
before solid rocket booster separation. The command receiver decoder provides protection to 
the solid rocket booster retrieval crew by returning the safe and arm device to SAFE and turning 
off range safety power shortly before solid rocket booster separation. 
In addition, the command receiver decoder provides 
isolation and interconnection for cross strapped ARM and 
FIRE commands between solid rocket boosters and ARM 
latching switch INHIBIT/RESET control. The command 
receiver decoder INHIBIT function protects the Space 
Transportion System and crew from inadvertent destruct 
during final launch countdown after ordnance is 
connected and the safe and arm device is commanded 
into the ARM position (T-4 minutes 55 seconds to T-10 
seconds). The command receiver decoder also provides 
range safety system status to telemetry and ARMED 
indication to alert the crew. 
The command receiver decoder routs range safety system measurements through the solid 
rocket booster multiplexer/demultiplexer to the Orbiter transmission system and provides energy 
output current pulse to fire the NASA standard detonator, initiating the pyro chain needed for 
airborne command destruct sequence. Before its first flight, the command receiver decoder was 
given exhaustive qualification testing to ensure compliance with revised loads environments. 
Additionally, an extensive flight safety review process ensured that the entire community was in 
agreement with the changes to the flight hardware and risk documentation.
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Public Entry Risk Assessment Flight Rule Updates 
Updates were made to Shuttle Flight Rule A2-207 
to address the entry public risk consideration per 
the NPR 8715.5, Range Safety Program. The 
updates were a result of updated population 
numbers using LandScan 2005 and an updated 
probabilistic risk assessment incorporating late 
inspection to lower the overall probability of loss 
of vehicle. As a result of these analyses, it was 
seen that the current flight rule placards for 
nominal End-Of-Mission and Compromised 
Orbiter entries needed to be adjusted. The new 
flight rule was accepted during a Shuttle Flight 
Rule Control Board meeting in November 2007.
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Summary 
As always, Range Safety has been involved in a number of exciting and challenging activities 
and events. Throughout the year, we have strived to meet our goal of protecting the public, the 
workforce, and property during range operations. 
During the past year, Range Safety was involved in the development, implementation, and 
support of range safety policy. Range Safety training curriculum development was completed 
this year and several courses were presented. Tailoring exercises concerning the Constellation 
Program were undertaken with representatives from the Constellation Program, the 45th Space 
Wing, and the Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel. 
Range Safety actively supported the Range Commanders Council and it subgroups and 
remained involved in updating policy related to flight safety systems and flight safety analysis. In 
addition, Range Safety supported the Space Shuttle Range Safety Panel and addressed policy 
concerning unmanned aircraft systems. Launch operations at Kennedy Space Center, the 
Eastern and Western ranges, Dryden Flight Research Center, and Wallops Flight Facility were 
addressed. 
Range Safety was also involved in the evaluation of a number of research and development 
efforts, including the space-based range (formerly STARS), the autonomous flight safety 
system, the enhanced flight termination system, and the joint advanced range safety system. 
Flight safety system challenges were evaluated. 
Range Safety's role in the Space Florida Customer Assistance Service Program for the Eastern 
Range was covered along with our support for the Space Florida Educational Balloon Release 
Program. 
We hope you have found the web-based format both accessibleand easy to use. Anyone 
having questions or wishing to have an article included in the 2008 Range Safety Annual Report 
should contact Alan Dumont, the NASA Range Safety Program Manager located at the 
Kennedy Space Center, or Michael Dook at NASA Headquarters.
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